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Foreword
Climate change is one of the greatest threats to human rights of our 
generation, posing a serious risk to the fundamental rights to life, health, food 
and an adequate standard of living of individuals and communities across the 
world. This report aims to support government and private decision makers 
by assessing the relationship between climate change and human rights law.
While the United Nations and national governments acknowledge that 
climate change and the responses to it can impact on human rights, there is 
less agreement on the corresponding obligations of governments and private 
actors to address this problem. The relationship between human rights and the 
environment has been much debated over the past few decades, supported by 
UNEP, OHCHR and the Human Rights Council-appointed Special Rapporteur, 
specifically the identification of positive, mutually reinforcing links between the 
fields of law and policy.
This UNEP report sheds light on the human rights obligations of both 
governments and private actors in responding to climate change, including those relating to rights to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice, as well as obligations relating to adaption and 
mitigation. 
The report makes a number of recommendations on how governments and other actors may address climate 
change. These include the need to recognize the link between climate change and human rights in climate-related 
processes and activities. The report also highlights the need for greater ambition with regard to mitigation, human 
rights safeguards for international climate finance mechanisms, financial assistance for developing countries faced 
with adaptation, and the development of an international mechanism on climate-induced displacement and 
migration. In addition, the report proposes a number of new human rights-related mechanisms for international 
coordination and accountability in delivering these outcomes. 
The Paris agreement is a stepping stone rather than the end objective for climate change action. So I hope that, 
whatever the outcome, this report will become a central reference for anybody involved in making climate or 
environmental related decisions in the crucial years ahead.
Achim Steiner
UNEP Executive Director
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Foreword
Ten years ago, the Inuit people asked the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission to hear their claim that the unchecked effects of climate change 
were violating their human rights. At the time, the request seemed quixotic, 
especially after the Commission declined to hear the case. In retrospect, 
however, the Inuit petition was the first harbinger of a sea-change in how the 
international community thinks about climate change.
In 2007, a group of small island states came together to adopt the Male’ 
Declaration, the first intergovernmental statement that “climate change has 
clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.” The 
next year, they convinced the United Nations Human Rights Council to adopt 
the first of what became a series of resolutions linking climate change to a host 
of impacts on human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights then issued a seminal report describing those effects. And in 2010, the 
State Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed in 
Cancun that the “Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully 
respect human rights.” The relevance of human rights to climate change is now universally recognized. On Human 
Rights Day last year, December 10, 2014, all 78 UN human rights mandate-holders came together to issue a joint 
statement underscoring the threat climate change poses to human rights, and unanimously calling on States “to 
make sure that human rights are at the core of climate change governance.”
At the same time, the human rights norms relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment have been clarified. As the first UN Independent Expert (and as of March 2015, the first Special 
Rapporteur) on human rights and the environment, I have had the honor of hearing from practitioners and scholars 
all over the world how human rights are being applied to environmental problems generally and to climate change 
in particular. The question is no longer whether human rights law has anything to say about climate change, but 
rather what it says and how it can best be brought to bear.
This report is the most detailed and comprehensive study yet undertaken of those questions. It arrives at a critical 
moment, as the Parties to the UNFCCC meet in Paris to begin a new chapter in our generational effort to defeat 
climate change. The report provides an indispensable basis for climate policy going forward, helping us see in 
detail how climate change threatens our ability to enjoy our human rights, and also how the exercise of human 
rights can inform and guide our climate policies. As the report makes clear, a human rights perspective on climate 
change not only provides a stark warning of what is at stake - it also gives us a beacon of hope that we can solve 
this problem together.
John H. Knox,
UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment
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Executive Summary 
It has long been recognized that a clean, healthy and functional environment is integral to the enjoyment of human 
rights, such as the rights to life, health, food and an adequate standard of living. Anthropogenic climate change is 
the largest, most pervasive threat to the natural environment and human societies the world has ever experienced. 
The latest assessment report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes how observed 
and predicted changes in climate will adversely affect billions of people and the ecosystems, natural resources, and 
physical infrastructure upon which they depend. These harmful impacts include sudden-onset events that pose 
a direct threat to human lives and safety, as well as more gradual forms of environmental degradation that will 
undermine access to clean water, food, and other key resources that support human life.
As a consequence, climate change will have a profound effect on the enjoyment of human rights for individuals 
and communities across the planet. This is not merely an abstract, future possibility. Climate change is already 
affecting temperatures, hydrologic conditions, ecosystem functioning, and agricultural productivity in many 
regions. Displacement is also an imminent prospect for some communities, such as those situated in the rapidly 
melting Arctic and low-lying coastal areas. 
Further complicating the picture, measures undertaken to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to 
climate change can themselves adversely affect the enjoyment of human rights. The international community has 
pledged to allocate or direct $100 billion (US) per year to funding mitigation and adaptation projects in developing 
nations. It is critical that as the world endeavors to address climate change, it do so with full respect for human 
rights.
This report describes how governments and other actors may address climate change in a manner consistent with 
their obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfill human rights. One key goal is to inform the decisions 
undertaken by the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). However, the analysis and recommendations set forth in this report are not limited to the current round 
of international climate negotiations. Another key goal is to inform decisions and actions undertaken by nations, 
sub-national governments, international organizations and private actors pursuing climate action both within and 
beyond the context of the UNFCCC in the coming years.  
Part I describes the latest projections and observations of how climate change impacts and responses can affect 
the environment, individuals and communities. Some of the key findings include:
• The impacts of climate change on freshwater resources, ecosystems, and human settlements are 
already undermining access to clean water, food, shelter, and other basic human needs; interfering 
with livelihoods; and displacing people from their homes. Even if we remain within the international 
goal of 2° C of global warming, these impacts will expand dramatically in the coming decades.
• These impacts constitute a serious interference with the exercise of fundamental human rights, such 
as the rights to life, health, water, food, housing, and an adequate standard of living.
• Mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering measures can also adversely affect the exercise of human 
rights. For example, there are documented instances of hydroelectric and biofuel projects that have 
resulted in human rights violations. There is also a high risk of human rights violations resulting from 
the implementation of resettlement programs for those who are displaced or at risk of displacement 
due to climate change, and a corresponding need to ensure that such programs are undertaken with 
adequate input and consent from those who are relocated.
Part II summarizes the obligations of governments and private actors to respond to these impacts. This section 
begins by reviewing how UN agencies and national governments have come to understand the relationship 
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between climate change and human rights. It then provides a more detailed discussion of specific obligations in 
this context. These include:
• Procedural obligations for all governments to ensure that the affected public is: (i) adequately informed 
about the impacts of climate change and the measures undertaken to both mitigate and adapt to 
climate change; (ii) adequately involved in public decisions about climate change; and (iii) given access 
to administrative, judicial, and other remedies when rights are violated as a result of climate change 
and responses to it.
• Substantive obligations for all governments to: (i) protect human rights from climate-related harms; 
(ii) respond to the core drivers of climate change by regulating GHG emissions within their jurisdiction; 
(iii) cooperate internationally to protect human rights against climate-related harms; (iv) address 
the transboundary impacts of climate change; and (v) safeguard human rights in all mitigation and 
adaptation activities.
• States also have unique obligations with respect to certain groups, including women, children, and 
indigenous peoples. Notably, states must obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) before 
undertaking any measures that would adversely affect the traditional lands and resources of indigenous 
peoples.
• Private actors also have obligations to address the human rights implications of climate change, and 
should refer to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to ensure that they fully 
respect human rights in all activities.
Part III discusses the implementation of these obligations, focusing primarily on activities undertaken by national 
governments either within or outside of the UNFCCC context. It documents several recent developments in this 
area:
• Some states are beginning to recognize the linkages between human rights and climate change in 
reports submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat, but this is not the case for the majority of developed 
nations.
• There is a significant “emissions gap” between the mitigation commitments set forth in the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and the emission reductions required to keep warming 
at or below 2°C. 
• There is also a significant “adaptation finance gap” in terms of what will be needed to adapt to 
climate change and the finance, technology and capacity available.
• Finally, there is a significant “finance gap” between the financial and technical assistance that has 
been given or pledged to developing countries and the resources that will be required to ensure that 
climate change does not interfere with the exercise of human rights in those countries. This is true 
even if we do meet the 2°C target. 
• Most international climate finance mechanisms are accompanied by safeguards to protect human 
rights, but there is room for improvement, especially with respect to the monitoring and assessment 
of these programs and any human rights violations.
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Part Iv provides recommendations on how national governments and other actors can better integrate human 
rights considerations into their mitigation and adaptation activities. Our key recommendations for the parties to 
the UNFCCC include:
• National parties should commit to more ambitious mitigation targets to ensure that the global 
average temperature increase remains at or below 2°C.
• The COP should recognize the link between climate change and human rights in the Paris 
Agreement.
• The safeguards for the various climate finance mechanisms should be made uniform and 
revised to ensure full respect for human rights.
• National parties should increase financial and technical assistance to developing countries that are 
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, to protect human rights in those areas.
• National parties should continue to discuss the issue of loss and damage in a transparent way that 
will address the concerns of all affected countries. 
The report also contains other recommendations to national governments on measures they can adopt unilaterally 
to protect human rights in the context of climate change, as well as recommendations to local governments and 
private actors.  
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Introduction 
The natural environment provides human beings and the communities in which we live with the resources we 
need to achieve lives of dignity and well-being – clean air to breathe; clean water to drink; food to eat; fuels for 
energy; protection from storms, floods, fires and drought; climate regulation and disease control; and places to 
congregate for aesthetic, recreational and spiritual enjoyment. These environmental endowments—often referred 
to as ecosystem services—are at once essential to core survival and vital to human flourishing. As the nations of 
the world declared in The Future We Want, the outcome document of the 2012 Rio+20 conference, sustainable 
development requires that we angle toward “harmony with nature.”1 To achieve this idea, we must balance 
economic, social and human development with “ecosystem conservation, regeneration and restoration and 
resilience in the face of new and emerging challenges.”2 
The nature of the linkages between the environment and human rights has been debated for years. However, it 
has long been recognized that a clean, healthy and functional environment is integral to the enjoyment of human 
rights, such as the rights to life, health, food and an adequate standard of living. This recognition offers one reason 
the international community has banded together through multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to 
prohibit illegal trade in wildlife, to preserve biodiversity and marine and terrestrial habitats, to reduce transboundary 
pollution, and to prevent other behaviors that harm the planet and its residents. In short: Environmental protection 
protects human rights. At the same time, adherence to human rights—such as those that ensure public access 
to information and participation in decision making—contributes to more just decisions about the utilization 
and protection of environmental resources, and protects against the potential for abuse under the auspices of 
environmental action. Thus, domestic environmental laws and MEAs can both be strengthened through the 
incorporation of human rights principles, even as they contribute to the ongoing realization of human rights. 
Anthropogenic climate change is the largest, most pervasive threat to the natural environment and human rights 
of our time. Climate change has already begun to have far-reaching environmental impacts, including many 
adverse effects on wildlife, natural resources and the ecological processes that support access to clean water, 
food, and other basic human needs. These impacts, combined with direct harms to people, property, and physical 
infrastructure, pose a serious threat to the enjoyment and exercise of human rights across the world.3 The mandate 
to take immediate action to both reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global climate change 
and enact measures that reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to climate change impacts is clear. Yet, certain 
responses to climate change—including both mitigation and adaptation activities—can also interfere with human 
rights, as has been the case for a number of hydroelectric and biofuel projects undertaken, in part, to reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions. It is critical that as the world endeavors to address the “super wicked” problem 
of climate change it do so with full respect for human rights. 
Over the course of the last decade the international community has arrived at a clear consensus on all of these issues. 
Yet, while United Nations agencies and national governments have explicitly acknowledged that climate change 
and responses to climate change can impair human rights, there has been less agreement on the corresponding 
obligations of governments and private actors to address this problem. The purpose of this report is to inform the 
decisions undertaken by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) at COP-21, as well as other activities undertaken by governments and private actors, 
by providing an up-to-date assessment of the relationship between climate change and human rights law and by 
making recommendations for incorporating a human rights lens into international and domestic climate action. 
Part I describes the latest projections and observations of how climate change impacts and responses can affect 
the environment, individuals and communities and the exercise of human rights. Part II summarizes the obligations 
of governments and private actors to respond to these impacts. Part III discusses the implementation of these 
obligations, focusing primarily on activities undertaken by national governments either within or outside of the 
UNFCCC context. Part Iv provides recommendations on how the COP, national governments, and other actors can 
better integrate human rights considerations into their mitigation and adaptation activities.
1 UN GA Res. 66/288, The Future We Want, p. 40, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288 (July 7, 2012). 
2 Id. p. 4.
3 See, e.g., UNHRC Resolutions 10/4 (March 25, 2009), 18/22 (Oct. 17, 2011), and 26/27 (June 27, 2014).
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The Human Rights Implications of Climate Change 
1.1 Effects of Climate Change on Human Rights
Climate change poses an enormous threat to the lives and well-being of individuals and communities across 
the world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) provides a 
detailed picture of how the observed and predicted climactic changes will adversely affect millions of people and 
the ecosystems, natural resources, and physical infrastructure upon which they depend.4 These harmful impacts 
include sudden-onset events that pose a direct threat to human lives and safety, as well as more gradual forms of 
environmental degradation that will undermine access to clean water, food, and other key resources that support 
human life. 
Thus, climate change will have a profound effect on the enjoyment of human rights for billions of people. This is not 
merely an abstract, future possibility. Climate change is already contributing to drought, ecosystem degradation, 
and food shortages across the world.5 Some regions are hit harder than others, with more clearly attributable 
linkages to climate change—for example, sea level rise has adversely affected the safety and livelihoods of many 
coastal inhabitants,6 and rising temperatures are causing significant changes in the Arctic ecosystems that support 
many indigenous communities.7 
4 IPCC, ClImate Change 2014: ImPaCts, adaPtatIon, and VulnerabIlIty, ContrIbutIon of the WorkIng grouP II to the fIfth assessment rePort of the IntergoVernmental Panel 
on ClImate Change (Cambridge University Press 2014).
5 Id. See also oxfam, enterIng unCharted Waters: el nIño and the threat to food seCurIty (2015).
6 Anthony Oliver-Smith, Sea Level Rise and the Vulnerability of Coastal Peoples: Responding to the Local Challenges of Global Climate Change in the 21st 
Century, UNU-EHS Publication No.7/2009 (July 2009).
7 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused 
by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Inuit Petition].
PART I













3C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S
T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T S  I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E
This section briefly summarizes the findings of the IPCC AR5, specifically the contribution of Working Group II on 
Impacts, Adaptation, and vulnerability. For each impact area, the effect on specific human rights is also noted.8 A 
more detailed summary of what these rights entail is provided in Appendix A. The discussion focuses on impacts 
that are projected to occur under the intermediate emissions scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), corresponding with 
a global mean temperature increase between 1.1 and 3.1C. The severity of these impacts will be significantly 
worse in a high emissions scenario (RCP8.5), which would correspond with a temperature increase between 2.6 
and 4.8°C.
(a) Impacts on Ecosystems and Natural Resources
(i) Freshwater Resources
According to IPCC projections, climate change will significantly reduce surface water and groundwater resources in 
most dry subtropical regions, thus intensifying competition for water among agriculture, ecosystems, settlements, 
industry, and energy production, and affecting regional water, energy, and food security.9 Climate change will also 
increase the frequency of droughts in presently dry areas. The primary drivers of these projected water shortages 
and droughts include: (i) reduced rainfall, (ii) reduced snowpack, resulting in less snowmelt supplying rivers and 
streams; (iii) higher temperatures, which increase evaporation from surface water and soils; and (iv) sea level rise, 
which contributes to saltwater inundation of freshwater resources. In addition, variations in the timing, magnitude, 
and type of precipitation, as well as temperature increases and sea level rise, can harm freshwater ecosystems 
by changing stream flow and water quality. This can also lead to the degradation of water supplies for human 
consumption, agriculture, and other uses. 
Affected rights: right to water and sanitation, right to health, right to life, right to food, right to an adequate 
standard of living.
8 The rights identified in this report are based on the core international human rights treaties. For the full text of these treaties and protocols, see un 
offICe of the hIgh CommIssIoner for human rIghts (ohChr), the Core InternatIonal human rIghts treatIes (2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/CoreInternationalHumanRightsTreaties_en.pdf. For an explanation of treaty implementation, see OHCHR, The United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty System, Fact Sheet No. 30, Rev. 1 (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet30Rev1.pdf. For a more detailed 
overview of specific rights, such as the rights to water, food, health, and housing, see OHCHR, Publications and Resources: Fact Sheets, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/FactSheets.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)

































Climate change will reduce freshwater availability in arid regions that are already suffering from severe water shortages and drought, such as 
the remote Turkana region of Northern Kenya, where residents had to collect water from dry riverbeds during a period of prolonged drought.
4C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S
T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T S  I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E
(ii) Terrestrial Ecosystems
Even under the intermediate emissions scenarios there is a “high risk” that climate change will cause “abrupt 
and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure, and function of terrestrial and freshwater 
ecosystems” in this century.10 Many plant and animal species have already moved their ranges and changed 
their behavior in response to observed climate change over recent decades, but many others will be unable to 
move quickly enough or otherwise adapt to changing climactic conditions.11 Thus, the IPCC predicts that climate 
change will “reduce the populations, vigor, and viability” of many species, especially those with spatially restricted 
populations, and will increase the extinction risk for many species.12 
In addition, increased tree death has been observed in many places worldwide, and there is high confidence that 
this can be attributed to climate change in some regions.13 “Forest dieback” is a major environmental risk, which 
has potentially significant impacts on climate, biodiversity, water quality, wood production, and livelihoods. The 
drivers of tree death include high temperatures and drought, and changes in the abundance of insect pests and 
pathogens (related, in part, to warming).14 
Affected rights: right to food, right to an adequate standard of living, right to health.
(iii) Coastal Systems and Low-lying Areas
The IPCC projects that coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience adverse impacts such 
as submergence, flooding, erosion, and saltwater intrusion, primarily due to sea level rise (although increased 
precipitation and storm surges will also contribute to these impacts). For the two intermediate emissions scenarios, 
the projected mean sea level rise ranges from .36-.73 meters by 2100, with large regional and local variations.15 
There will also likely be an increase in the occurrence of the most severe tropical cyclones.16 Finally, the physical 
composition of coastal and estuarine ecosystems will be altered by changes in precipitation and river flow, increased 
water temperatures, and ocean acidification, and this will contribute to a decline in biodiversity and ecosystem 
productivity along coastlines.17
The projected increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones, exacerbated by sea level rise and the degradation of 
ecosystems that provide protection from storms and flooding, will pose a direct threat to human lives and coastal 
settlements. Without adaptation, IPCC AR5 projects with high confidence that “hundreds of millions of people 
will be affected by coastal flooding and will be displaced due to land loss by year 2100.”18 Coastal communities 
will also be adversely affected by the more gradual degradation of land, soils, freshwater resources, and coastal 
and estuarine ecosystems. 
Affected rights: right to life, right to health, right to housing, right to an adequate standard of living, right to 
food, right to water, right to property, right to self-determination.
(iv) Ocean Systems 
Climate change is altering the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the ocean; scientists have already 
observed large-scale distribution shifts of species and altered ecosystem composition as a result of ocean warming 
(e.g., the distribution of many fish and invertebrates have shifted poleward and/or to deeper, cooler waters).19 The 
IPCC thus predicts that, in response to further warming by 1°C or more, there will be large, irreversible shifts in the 
spatial distribution of species and seasonal timing of their activities (feeding, growth, development, behaviors, and 
productivities), which will have implications for ecosystem goods and services.20 It is likely that the spatial shifts of 
10 Id. at 276.
11 Id. at 274-275.
12 Id. at 275.
13 Id. at 276.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 369.
16 There is not yet consensus on whether climate change will affect the severity of extratropical cyclones. Id. at 368.
17 Id. at 368.
18 Id. at 364.
19 Id. at 414.
20 Id.
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marine species will cause species richness to increase at mid- and high latitudes, and decrease at tropical latitudes. 
This has serious implications for marine productivity and food security in tropical areas.21 
Affected rights: right to food, right to an adequate standard of living, right to health.
(v) Food Security and Production Systems 
The effects of climate change on crop and terrestrial food production are already evident in several regions of the 
world. Some high-latitude regions, such as northeast China and the U.K., have experienced a modest increase in 
productivity as a result of recent warming trends.22 However, changes in temperature and rainfall precipitation 
have also negatively affected wheat and maize production in many regions.23 There is also evidence that extreme 
weather events (storms and flooding) have impacted food production, but it is not possible to say that these 
specific events were caused by climate change (although climate change will increase the likelihood of such 
events).24 As noted above, climate change is also adversely impacting the productivity of fisheries.
Going forward, it is very likely that climate change will adversely impact the production of major crops (wheat, 
rice, and maize) in both tropical and temperate regions.25 The food security risk will be greatest in low-latitude 
countries, where there is high confidence that crop production will be “consistently and negatively” affected by 
climate change in a 2°C warming scenario (and fishery production will also decline).26 Even in the near term, the 
impacts on global food security could be devastating—for example, 10% of the projected impacts on food security 
under a 2°C warming scenario showed yield losses of more than 25% for the period 2030-2049.27 Greater losses 
are expected after 2050.28
Affected rights: right to food, right to health, right to life, right to an adequate standard of living.
(b) Impacts on Physical Infrastructure and Human Settlements
(i) Urban Areas
Climate-related phenomena such as rising sea levels, coastal storms, heat stress, extreme precipitation, inland and 
coastal flooding, landslides, drought, increased aridity, water scarcity, and air pollution “will have profound impacts 
on a broad spectrum of city functions, infrastructures, and services and will interact with and may exacerbate many 
existing stresses.”29 Urban climate change-related risks are increasing, with widespread negative impacts on people 
and their health, livelihoods, and assets, as well as local and national economies and ecosystems.30 These risks are 
amplified for those who live in informal settlements and hazardous areas, which often lack essential infrastructure 
and adaptive capacity, as well as individuals that are more vulnerable as a result of age, income, disability, or other 
factors.31 
Affected rights: right to life, right to housing, right to health, right to water and sanitation, right to an adequate 
standard of living, right to property.
(ii) Rural Areas
Climate change will affect water supply, food security, and agricultural incomes in rural areas.32 This will have 
implications for human health, livelihoods, incomes, and migration patterns. Some of the key impacts that create 
risk for rural communities include: rising temperatures and heat waves, changing precipitation patterns, and 
21 Id. at 414-415.
22 Id. at 491.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 488.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 504.
28 Id. at 488, 504.
29 Id. at 556.
30 Id. at 538.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 616.
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extreme weather events, and the corresponding impacts on human health, water supply, ecosystems, natural 
resources, crops, and physical structures. Rural areas are also uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
due to: (i) a greater dependence on agriculture and natural resources, such as fisheries and forests; and (ii) existing 
vulnerabilities caused by poverty, lower levels of education, physical isolation, and neglect by policymakers.33 Rural 
areas in developing countries face the most significant risks due to their geographical location (where climate 
change impacts are projected to be most severe), lack of adaptive capacity, and heavy reliance on agriculture and 
natural resources.34
Affected rights: right to life, right to health, right to housing, right to food, right to water and sanitation, right 
to an adequate standard of living, right to property.
(iii) Key Economic Sectors and Services
Climate change will affect a variety of economic sectors and services, including energy, water services, transport, 
agriculture and livestock, forestry, fisheries, tourism, and insurance. Food production systems, water supply systems, 
and other sectors and services that rely on natural resources in their supply chain are particularly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change.35 Electricity systems will also be affected, both through direct climactic impacts 
(e.g., higher temperatures, lower water supply) and through increased demand for electricity, both of which can 
compromise electric grid reliability.36
33 Id. at 618.
34 Id. at 631.
35 Id. at 674, 676. 
36 Id. at 664-672.
Changing precipitation patterns and higher temperatures can adversely affect food production in many parts of the world, such as Vietnam, where 
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Current estimates of global annual economic losses due to additional temperature increases of approximately 2°C 
are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income, but actual losses are more likely than not to be greater than these estimates, 
and there will be large differences in economic losses both between and within countries.37 Many of the direct and 
indirect economic losses will occur due to the decreased productivity of agricultural systems, fisheries, forests, and 
other natural resources. Other drivers of economic loss include direct impacts on human health, water shortages, 
and extreme weather events. 
Affected rights: right to health, right to an adequate standard of living, right to food, right to water.
(c) Impacts on Livelihoods, Health, and Security
(i) Livelihoods and Poverty
Climate-related hazards, including gradual changes and extreme weather events, will affect peoples’ livelihoods 
directly through impacts such as losses in crop yields; the destruction of natural resources, homes, and properties; 
and displacement. They will also have indirect effects on livelihoods by exacerbating other stressors—for example, 
climate change can contribute to: (i) increases in the prices of food, energy, and other critical commodities; (ii) 
political instability and large-scale conflict; and (iii) individual and household-level disturbances.38
Poverty, political instability, and conflict also undermine the ability of individuals and communities to adapt to 
climate change (e.g., by fortifying their physical assets or by moving to less vulnerable locations). Thus, climate 
change is one of many factors that can perpetuate a vicious cycle of poverty, deprivation, and inequality.39 
Affected rights: right to an adequate standard of living, right to health, right to life, right to food, right to water, 
right to property.
37 Id. at 663.
38 For example, studies have found an increase in gender-based violence within households following climate-related disasters as well as slow-onset climate 
events, owing to greater stress and tension, loss and grief, and disrupted safety nets. Id. at 809.
39 Id. at 817.
Aerial view of Kotzebue, Alaska, USA - an Inuit village facing the imminent prospect of displacement due to rising sea levels, melting permafrost, 
and erosion.
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(ii) Human Health
There is evidence that climate change has already contributed to health problems in some regions, and if climate 
change continues as projected under various scenarios, the major health impacts will include: (i) greater risk of 
injury, disease, and death due to more intense heat waves and fires; (ii) increased risk of under-nutrition resulting 
from diminished food production in poor regions; (iii) health consequences stemming from lost work capacity 
and reduced labor productivity in vulnerable populations; and (iv) increased risk of food-, water- and vector-borne 
diseases. 40 In some regions, the combined effects of higher average temperatures and higher humidity will also 
create significant health risks (especially those regions that already exceed the international standard for safe work 
activity during the hottest months of the year). Although there may be some positive health impacts, these will be 
increasingly outweighed by the magnitude and severity of negative health effects.41
Affected rights: right to health, right to life.
(iii) Human Security
Climate change will threaten human security42 by increasing the scarcity of key resources (e.g., water, food, land, and 
other natural resources), undermining livelihoods, compromising culture and identity, increasing displacement and 
migration, and challenging the ability of states to provide the conditions necessary for human security. Each of these 
impacts can directly affect human security, and can also contribute to political instability and violent conflict.43
Affected rights: right to life, right to an adequate standard of living, right to a nationality, right to self-
determination, right to mobility, right to property.
1.2 Effects of Mitigation and Adaptation on Human Rights
The manner in which governments and other actors respond to the challenges of climate change can also affect 
the enjoyment of human rights. This is true for actions undertaken to mitigate the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
that contribute to climate change, as well as projects undertaken to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
(a) Mitigation
There are numerous examples of how certain kinds of mitigation projects undertaken to reduce or sequester GHG 
emissions can adversely affect the rights of certain groups. The most egregious violations have occurred in the 
context of: 
1. Hydroelectric projects, which often lead to displacement of local people and the destruction of 
ecosystems upon which they depend, and can also harm the health and livelihoods of people living 
downstream from the project by reducing river flows.44
2. Biofuels policies and projects, which can contribute to food shortages and price shocks, additional 
water stress and scarcity, widespread deforestation, and displacement of indigenous peoples and 
40 Id. at 713.
41 Positive health impacts include modest reductions in cold-related mortality and morbidity in some areas due to fewer cold extremes, and reduced capacity 
of disease-carrying vectors due to extreme heat. Id.
42 In the IPCC report, “human security” is defined as “a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the 
freedom and capacity to live with dignity.” Id. at 759.
43 For example, in a report on Syria, the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food described how severe droughts, exacerbated by climactic changes 
in the region, led to crop failures and food shortages, thus undermining the right to food. Olivier De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Addendum, Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49/Add.2 (Jan. 27, 2011). Since then, the drought and food shortages have 
contributed to political instability and violent conflict, resulting in deaths, injuries and displacement of millions of people. See also U.N. Secretary-General, 
Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009).
44 IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Complaint, Guatemala / Real LRIF-01/Coban (Oct. 29, 2014) (complaint submitted to IFC alleging social and 
environmental harms from Santa Rita dam); eConomIC, soCIal & Cultural rIghts and ClImate Change: a legal referenCe guIde 68-69 (Sébastien Jodoin & 
Katherine Lofts eds., CISDL, GEM & ASAP 2013); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “First, Do No Harm’: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate Change, 38 ga. J. 
Int’l. & ComP. l. 593, 597-98 (2010); victoria Tauli-Corpuz & Aqqaluk Lynge, Impact of Climate Change Mitigation Measures on Indigenous Peoples and on 
their Territories and Lands, study presented at the UN Economic and Social Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 7th session, E/C.19/2008/10 
(2008); Tania Bodero et al., Request to meet about the Barro Blanco project during July 2013 visit to Panama (Centro de Incidencia Ambiental 2013).
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small-scale farmers through land acquisitions.45 According to a 2008 Oxfam Report, the “scramble 
to supply” biofuels like palm oil, which was partly driven by EU biofuel targets, exacerbated the 
food price crises, brought “30 million people into poverty,” and put 60 million indigenous people at 
risk.46 Numerous adverse impacts on local stakeholders and human rights violations have also been 
documented in the context of specific biofuel projects.47 
Many of these projects have been funded through the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
other climate finance mechanisms.48 Concerns have also been raised about the potential effect of the Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD/REDD+) program on indigenous groups and local 
stakeholders—specifically, that: (i) there may not be sufficient opportunities for input and consent from the 
people whose lives and livelihoods are affected by REDD/REDD+ projects; (ii) the commodification of forest carbon 
sequestration services will lead to land grabs that will displace people who lack adequate legal protections and 
land tenure; and (iii) the payments for those sequestration services will not be equitably distributed among local 
stakeholders.49
On a more general level, there are concerns about the distributional consequences of mitigation policies. Carbon 
pricing schemes, for example, can have a disproportionate effect on indigenous peoples, the poor, and other 
45 fao, ClImate Change adaPtatIon and mItIgatIon: Challenges and oPPortunItIes In the food seCtor 7 (2012); Nicola Colbran, Indigenous Peoples in Indonesia: 
At Risk of Disappearing as Distinct Peoples in the Rush for Biofuel? 18 Int’l J. on mInorIty & grouP rIghts 63 (2011); undP, human deVeloPment rePort 
2007/2008, fIghtIng ClImate Change: human solIdarIty In a dIVIded World 143 (2007); InternatIonal CounCIl on human rIghts, ClImate Change and human rIghts: a 
rough guIde 33-36 (2008), at 33-36; Olivier De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Building Resilience: A Human Rights Framework for 
World Food and Nutrition Security, ¶ 31, UN Doc A/HRC/9/23 (2008). 
46 oxfam, ClImate Wrongs and human rIghts: PuttIng PeoPle at the heart of ClImate-Change PolICy 15-16 (2008).
47  aCCountabIlIty Counsel, fuelIng human rIghts dIsasters: an examInatIon of the u.s. oVerseas PrIVate InVestment CorPoratIon’s InVestment In buChanan reneWables 
(2014); aCtIonaId, feelIng the bIofuels Pressure: human rIghts abuses In guatemala (2013); Center for human rIghts and global JustICe, foreIgn land deals and human 
rIghts: Case studIes on agrICultural and bIofuel InVestment (NYU School of Law 2010).
48 Jeanette Schade and Wolfgang Obergassel, Human Rights and the Clean Development Mechanism, 27 CambrIdge reVIeW of InternatIonal affaIrs 717 (2014); 
Roht-Arriaza (2010), supra note 44, at 597-598. See also Jake Abrahamson, An Indian Coal Plant’s Human Rights Crisis, sIerra, July 4, 2015 (discussing 
human rights abuses associated with the construction of the Sasan coal-fired power plant, which received CDM support because it employed more 
efficient coal technology); Anuradha Munshi, Bank Information Center Trust, Sasan Ultra Mega Power Project – A Brief Report (Sept. 2013) (further 
detailing adverse consequences on local communities associated with the Sasan project). 
49 Arturo Balderas Torres & Margaret Skutsch, Challenges for Pro-Poor Benefit Sharing Schemes in the Implementaiton of REDD+ in Mexico, teChnICal serIes: 
forest goVernanCe and eConomICs, No. 2 (IUCN 2014); Cristiane Faustino and Fabrina Furtado, The Green Economy, Forest Peoples and Territories: Rights 
Violations in the State of Acre (Platforma de Dirietos Humanos, Econômicos, Sociais, Culturais e Ambientais 2014); aled dIlWyn fIsher, a human rIghts-based 
aPProaCh to the enVIronment and ClImate Change: gI-esCr PraCtItIoner’s guIde 11 (2014); David Takacs, Environmental Democracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 
UC Hastings Legal Studies Research Paper No. 103 (2014); Joyeeta guPta et al., ClImate Change, forests, and redd: lessons for InstItutIonal desIgn (Routledge 
2013); Annalisa Savaresi, REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes, 18 eCology and soC’y J. 5 (2013); Margaret 
Skutsch, Slicing the REDD+ Pie: Controversies Around the Distribution of Benefits (2012).

















C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S
T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T S  I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E
vulnerable groups, who may suffer greater hardship due to the increased price of energy, fuel, and goods.50 Some 
commentators have also suggested that the commoditization of carbon emissions rights will contribute to, rather 
than alleviate, existing economic disparities between and within countries.51 These concerns may be alleviated 
through proper regulatory design, such as by including relief from increased costs or encouraging distributional 
equity in project siting decisions. 
(b) Adaptation
Both the failure to adapt and the implementation of adaptation measures can interfere with human rights, 
particularly for the most vulnerable. One concern is that some adaptation programs, may benefit one group 
to the detriment of another—as might be the case for coastal fortifications that protect one community while 
exposing another to greater risk of erosion and/or flooding. There is also the risk that adaptation measures will be 
undertaken without the necessary public consultation and may result in outcomes that adversely affect the very 
persons they aim to protect. There is a risk of human rights violations in the context of relocation and resettlement 
programs, and a corresponding need to ensure that such programs are undertaken with adequate input and 
consent from those who are relocated. It should be noted that both the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate 
Fund have put in place environmental and social safeguards.
(c) Geoengineering
Geoengineering refers to the deliberate and large-scale manipulation of natural systems through measures aimed 
at preventing or mitigating the effects of climate change, such as solar radiation management and ocean iron 
fertilization. Although there have not yet been any significant field tests of geoengineering technology, far less 
any large-scale geoengineering projects, it is important to note that such projects could seriously interfere with 
the enjoyment of human rights for millions and perhaps billions of people. For example, one recent study of five 
potential geoengineering methods deployed in high GHG emissions scenarios concluded that these methods 
could severely disrupt ocean and terrestrial ecosystems.52 These disruptive effects could undermine the provision of 
ecosystem goods and services, thus interfering with access to food, clean water, and other key resources. Another 
study found that proposals for solar radiation management would cause widespread regional-scale changes in 
precipitation.53 Such shifts could lead to increases in storms and flooding in some areas and drought in others, with 
adverse impacts on natural ecosystems and human settlements. In addition, there is at this time no mechanism 
in place to ensure that governments or private parties carrying out geoengineering projects coordinate with the 
international community, or even disclose information to allow for public participation. 
50 See, e.g., Jodoin & Lofts (2013), supra note 44, at 31-32; Karen Bubna-Litic, Climate Change Impacts on the Poor – A Case Study of Australia’s Indigenous 
Population and the Impact of Australia’s Response on this Population, in PoVerty alleVIatIon and enVIronmental laW (Yves Le Bouthillier et al. eds., Edward 
Elgar 2012). 
51 See, e.g., Torres & Skutsch (2014), supra note 49; Gupta et al. (2013), supra note 49; Mark Wilson, The Green Economy: The Dangerous Path of Nature 
Commoditization, 10 ConsIlIenCe: the Journal of sustaInable deVeloPment 85 (2013).
52 David Keller et al., Potential Climate Engineering Effectiveness and Side Effects During a High Carbon Dioxide-Emission Scenario, 5 nature CommunICatIons 
3304 (2014).
53 J.A. Crook et al., A Comparison of Temperature and Precipitation Responses to Different Earth Radiation Management Geoengineering Schemes, 120 
Journal of geoPhysICal researCh: atmosPheres DOI 10.1002/2015JD023269 (2015).
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PART II
The Obligations of Governments and Private Actors to 
Respond to the Human Rights Implications of Climate 
Change
While the linkages between climate change and human rights are clear, it is only in the past decade that UN human 
rights bodies and national governments have begun to develop consensus on this issue. Thus far, the consensus 
has extended to the understanding that climate change will interfere with the full enjoyment of human rights, as 
detailed in Part 1. There is less agreement on the nature of corresponding obligations of governments and private 
actors to address the human rights implications of climate change. However, there are several well-established and 
emerging principles that are applicable in this context. 
This section provides a brief history of how UN agencies and national governments have come to understand the 
relationship between climate change and human rights, before turning to a more detailed discussion of specific 
obligations for international agencies, national governments and private actors.54 The obligations discussed 
here are primarily based on the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as these comprise the core of international human rights law. State commitments 
under the UNFCCC and other agreements are also discussed in relation to these core treaty obligations. It is worth 
noting that a country’s legal obligations may differ depending on which treaties it has ratified. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to highlight all of these differences; however, there is growing consensus that most or all of the 
rights enumerated in the UDHR constitute customary international law, and as such, they are binding on all states 
regardless of treaty ratification status.55 
54 For detailed discussion of this political process, and the various positions of specific national governments, see John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and 
Climate Change and the United Nations, 33 harVard enVIronmental laW reVIeW 477 (2009).
55 See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, InternatIonal human rIghts laW: Cases, materIals, Commentary 63-66 (Cambridge University Press 2014); theodor meron, human 
rIghts and humanItarIan norms as Customary laW (Clarendon Press 1989); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 georgIa Journal of 
InternatIonal laW 37 (1995-1996).
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2.1 The Progressive Recognition of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Environment and Climate Change
(a) Recognition of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Environment
The core international human rights treaties do not recognize a freestanding right to a clean environment. However, 
it is generally understood that inadequate environmental conditions can undermine the effective enjoyment of 
other enumerated rights, such as the rights to life, health, water, and food. Some of the UN human rights treaties 
explicitly recognize this link. The ICESCR, for example, directs states to adopt measures as may be necessary for 
the “improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene” in order to fully realize the right to 
health.56 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) directs states to account for the “dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution” to ensure full implementation of the right to health for children.57 
In addition, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration recognized that there is “a fundamental right to freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.”58 While 
this declaration apparently recognizes a right to an adequate environment, it lacks the force of a binding treaty. 
Nonetheless, as noted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), this declaration 
reflects a “general recognition of the interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights and environment.”59 
OHCHR’s conclusion is supported by the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment’s 2013 
mapping report, which concluded that “[h]uman rights law includes obligations relating to the environment” that 
include both procedural obligations and substantive obligations.60 
Finally, the right to a clean environment has either been expressly included in or interpreted as a fundamental 
component of many regional human rights agreements and national constitutions.61 
(b) Recognition of Human Rights Obligations Relating to Climate Change
Two key events sparked a searching international dialogue on human rights and climate change. First, in December 
2005, the Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) requesting relief for human rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming 
and climate change. The petition specifically alleged that the United States—the largest cumulative emitter of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to date—had violated the Inuit’s human rights by failing to adopt adequate GHG 
controls.62 Although the IACHR never issued a decision, the petition did succeed in drawing public attention to the 
severe effects of global warming on the Inuit and sparking further dialogue about the human rights implications 
of climate change.63
Second, in November 2007, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) adopted the Male’ Declaration on the 
Human Dimension of Global Climate Change. The Male’ Declaration was the first international agreement to 
explicitly recognize that “climate change has clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human 
rights.” It also called upon the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC and the UN human rights bodies to 
launch a collaborative process for assessing the human rights implications of climate change.64 That same month, 
OHCHR issued a public statement for the Bali Climate Change Conference (COP-13) acknowledging that “climate 
change can adversely affect the fundamental human rights of present and future generations” and reminding the 
56 ICESCR Art. 12(2)(b).
57 CRC Art. 24(2)(c).
58 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”), June 16, 1972, Principle 1.
59 OHCHR further explains: “the United Nations human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic link between the environment and the realization of a 
range of human rights….” Report of the OHCHR on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61, Jan. 15, 2009 
at paras 17-18.
60 HRC, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment, John H. Knox, pp. 79-81, A/HRC/25/53 (Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter “Mapping Report”].
61 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (June 27, 1981), Art. 24; Protocol of San Salvador Protocol (Nov. 17, 1988), Art. 11; Arab Charter on 
Human Rights (May 22, 2004), Art. 38; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (Nov. 19, 2012), Art. 28; daVId boyd, the enVIronmental rIghts reVolutIon: a global 
study of ConstItutIons, human rIghts, and the enVIronment (2012); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights 
Have Been Recognized? 35 denV. J. Int’l l. & Pol’y 130 (2008); Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized under International 
Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 Colo. J. Int’l enVtl l. & Pol’y 1 (2001).
62 Inuit Petition (2005), supra note 7.
63 Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 am. IndIan l. reV. 675 (2007).
64 Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change (Nov. 14, 2007).
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COP that governments have both moral and legal obligations to protect and promote basic human rights when 
tackling climate change.65
Responding to the Male’ Declaration, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) issued a 2008 resolution, expressing 
concern that climate change “poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the 
world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights,” and directing OHCHR to conduct a “detailed 
analytical study of the relationship between climate change and human rights” in consultation with states and 
other relevant international organizations and intergovernmental bodies.66
OHCHR released a report in 2009 describing how the observed and projected impacts of climate change have 
implications for the enjoyment of human rights and for the obligations of states under international human rights 
law.67 The report found that “[a]n increase in global average temperatures of approximately 2° C will have major, 
and predominantly negative, effects on ecosystems across the globe, on the goods and services they provide,” that 
it will “exacerbate the harmful effects of environmental pollution,” and that these effects “have implications for a 
wide range of human rights.”68 The report discussed specific examples of those rights which relate most directly to 
climate change-related impacts, including the rights to life, food, water, health, housing, and self-determination. 
It also highlighted effects on specific groups, including women, children, and indigenous peoples. 
Despite concluding that there is “broad agreement that climate change has generally negative effects on the 
realization of human rights,” OHCHR noted that “it is less obvious whether, and to what extent, such effects 
can be qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal sense.” This statement reflected the position of many 
developed countries that were willing to accept that climate change could interfere with the enjoyment of human 
rights, but would not concede that this interference constituted a violation of international human rights law.69 
OHCHR justified this conclusion by citing challenges of causation, attribution, and future harm associated with 
climate change.70
Nonetheless, OHCHR concluded that states have a duty to address the effects of climate change on human 
rights regardless of whether the state has contributed to climate change in a manner which gives rise to specific 
human rights violations. 71 This is because “human rights law requires each State to do more than merely refrain 
from interfering with human rights itself; it also requires the State to undertake due diligence to protect against 
such harm from other sources.”72 Accordingly, OHCHR identified a number of national level obligations that are 
applicable in this context, such as the obligation to protect individuals against foreseeable threats of weather-
related hazards,73 and to provide access to information and participation in decision-making.74 OHCHR also 
described various “obligations of international cooperation,” thus asserting that countries have an obligation to 
address the extraterritorial effects of climate change.75 
65 OHCHR, The Human Rights Impact of Climate Change, UN Joint Press Kit for Bali Climate Change Conference, 3-14 December 2007 (Nov. 2007).
66 UNHRC Res. 7/23, Human rights and climate change, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/7/23 (March 28, 2008).
67 OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human 
Rights, A/HRC/10/61 (2009) [hereinafter “OHCHR Report”]. 
68 Id. at p. 16.
69 Knox (2009), supra note 58, at 489-90; Mark Limon, Human Rights Obligations and Accountability in the Face of Climate Change, 38 ga. J. Int’l & ComP. 
l. 543, 571-73 (2010).
70 OHCHR Report (2009), supra note 71, at p. 70. It bears noting that these issues are becoming less problematic over time. For one thing, recent research on 
current and historical GHG emissions has made it easier to allocate responsibility for emissions among different states. See, e.g., World Resources Institute, 
CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2015), http://cait.wri.org; tommI ekholm & tomI J. lIndroos, assessIng CountrIes’ hIstorICal ContrIbutIons to ghg emIssIons, Research 
Report vvT-R-00139-15 (2015); H. Damon Matthews, Quantifying Historical Carbon and Climate Debts Among Nations, nature ClImate Change letters, DOI: 
10.1038 (Sept. 7, 2015). In addition, as the effects of climate change become increasingly apparent, it is possible to identify, with greater certainty, those 
effects which can be causally traced to climate change (e.g., sea level rise and increased average temperatures). IPCC (2014), supra note 4.
71 OHCHR Report (2009), supra note 71, at p. 71. See also Knox (2009), supra note 58, at 491 (“whether a state causes climate change is a separate 
question from whether it has a duty to address the effects of climate change on human rights”).
72 John H. Knox, Human Rights Principles and Climate Change, Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 2523599, 8 (2014).
73 OHCHR Report (2009), supra note 71, at p. 74.
74 Id. at pp. 78-79.
75 Id. at pp. 84-91.
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Since the issuance of this report, UNHRC has issued five resolutions recognizing the linkages between climate 
change and human rights.76 These include:
• Resolution 10/4 (2009), which recognized that international cooperation would be “necessary” to 
enable implementation of the UNFCCC.77
• Resolution 18/22 (2011), which affirmed that “human rights obligations, standards and principles 
have the potential to inform and strengthen international and national policymaking in the area of 
climate change, promoting policy coherence, legitimacy, and sustainable outcomes” and that “in 
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence” as a result of climate change.” 
Resolution 18/22 also called for additional dialogue on how to address the adverse impacts of climate 
change on the full enjoyment of human rights.78
• Resolution 26/27 (2014), which explicitly noted the “urgent importance of continuing to address, 
as they relate to States’ human rights obligations, the adverse consequences of climate change for 
all, particularly in developing countries and its people whose situation is most vulnerable to climate 
change, especially those in a situation of extreme poverty, and deteriorating livelihood conditions.”79
• Resolution 29/15 (2015), which contained effectively the same language on “States’ human rights 
obligations” as Resolution 26/27, and called for new study on the relationship between climate change 
and the human right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.80 
Although UNHRC has not yet issued a clear declaration on the obligations of governments or other actors to 
respond to the human rights implications of climate change, there is ample evidence that certain obligations 
do exist. Specifically, the Independent Expert’s 2013 mapping report on Human Rights Obligations Relating to 
the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment outlines numerous statements from the 
UN human rights treaties and treaty bodies charged with overseeing them, other UN bodies and mechanisms, 
regional human rights systems, and international environmental instruments, all recognizing various human rights 
obligations related to climate change.81 The results of that report are incorporated into the analysis in Section 2.2, 
below. 
The UNFCCC COP also formally recognized the linkages between climate change and human rights in the 2010 
Cancun Agreements, where the Parties agreed to emphasize that countries “should, in all climate change-related 
actions, fully respect human rights.”82 But the COP has done very little in the past five years to elaborate on how 
countries should fulfill that goal. In the interim, numerous declarations and submissions have been made calling 
for the COP to incorporate human rights considerations into its decisions and agreements, and most notably, the 
2015 Paris Agreement.83
76 In addition, many regional bodies have issued decisions on the linkages between climate change and human rights. See African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa, ACHPR/Res.153(xLvI)09 (2009); 
Organization of American States, General Assembly, Resolution 2429: “Human Rights and Climate Change in the Americas”, AG/Res. 2429 (xxxvIII-O/08) 
(OAS June 3, 2008).
77 UNHRC Res. 10/4, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/10/4 (March 25, 2009). Some developing countries sought the stronger language, but 
were unable to convince developed countries to accept it. Limon (2010), supra note 73, at 455.
78 UNHRC Res. 18/22, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/18/22 (Oct. 17, 2011).
79 UNHRC Res. 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/26/27 (July 15, 2014) (emphasis added).
80 UNHRC Res. 29/15, Human Rights and Climate Change. A/HRC/Res/29/15 (July 2, 2015).
81 Mapping Report (2013), supra note 64; UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment, Focus Report on Human Rights and Climate 
Change (June 2014).
82 UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements, p. 8, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (March 15, 2011).
83 See, e.g., Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of the HRC, A New Climate Change Agreement Must Include Human Rights Protections for All (October 17, 
2014).
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2.2 Governmental Obligations to Address the Human Rights Implications of Climate 
Change
The obligations of governments with respect to international human rights are frequently characterized as entailing 
three types of duties:84
• The duty to respect human rights, a negative obligation, which requires states to refrain from taking 
actions that would interfere with or curtail the enjoyment of human rights.
• The duty to protect human rights against violations by third parties.
• The duty to fulfill human rights, a positive obligation, which requires states to undertake measures to 
ensure the realization of rights for all members of society.
Some documents also refer to a duty to “promote” human rights, which can be understood as a related but 
distinct obligation to “promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all human rights.”85 
Another way to conceptualize government duties in this context is to divide them into 1) procedural obligations, 
2) substantive obligations, and 3) obligations in relation to individuals who are members of specific groups. This 
approach is particularly helpful for understanding the linkages between different obligations, and so we use it 
here. 
84 OHCHR, International Human Rights Law, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
85 vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Art. 1 (June 25, 1993) (endorsed by G.A. Res. 48/121). See also G.A. Res. 53/144, Declaration on the Right 
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Art. 1 (Dec. 9, 1998) (noting states’ responsibility to “promote” human rights); m. magdalena sePúlVeda, the nature of the oblIgatIons under the InternatIonal 
CoVenant on eConomIC, soCIal and Cultural rIghts 157-167 (Intersentia 2003) (explaining typologies for human rights obligations).
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For each set of obligations, we describe the “hard law” (treaty provisions, case law) underpinning the obligations, 
as well as soft law (UN declarations, comments from UN treaty bodies) and interpretations from UN special 
rapporteurs and other experts. As noted above, the actual scope of legal obligations for any specific country 
may depend on treaty ratification status, except to the extent that some of these obligations may now constitute 
customary international law that is binding all countries.86
(a) Procedural Obligations
Human rights law imposes various procedural obligations on governments with respect to the environmental 
impacts of their activities. These include obligations to gather and disseminate information about environmental 
impacts, to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making, and to provide access to remedies for 
environmental harm. These obligations are based in civil and political rights, but “they have been clarified and 
extended in the environmental context on the basis of the entire range of human rights at risk from environmental 
harm.”87 
As discussed below, governments also have unique obligations with respect to decisions that affect indigenous 
peoples and their lands, such as a duty to obtain the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples 
before undertaking decisions that would adversely affect any lands or resources that they have traditionally owned 
or occupied. 
(i) Ensuring Access to Information and Conducting Environmental Assessments
ICCPR Art. 19 and UDHR Art. 19 recognize the right of all persons “to seek, receive and impart information.” At 
a minimum, the ICCPR and UDHR require states to provide public access to any government information of public 
interest.88 The Human Rights Committee (HR Committee), the treaty body for the ICCPR, has not explicitly discussed 
whether the right of access to information entails a corresponding obligation for states to conduct environmental 
impact assessments (EIA). However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that, as a matter of customary 
international law, states have an obligation vis-à-vis other states to conduct environmental assessments where 
there is a risk that a proposed activity “may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in 
particular, on a shared resource” and disclose the results of that EIA to countries that may be adversely affected. 89 
Accordingly, states should assess how activities within their jurisdiction will adversely affect the climate (a shared 
resource) and provide adequate notice to the international community. For example, states should conduct GHG 
assessments for activities that are likely to have significant GHG impacts—such as programmatic decisions about 
fossil fuel development, large fossil fuel-fired power plants, and fuel economy standards—and make the results 
publicly available.
The right of access to information is generally viewed as a prerequisite to the exercise of other procedural rights 
relating to public participation and access to remedies, and these procedural rights have been interpreted as critical 
to the exercise of substantive human rights, such as the rights to life, health, and privacy.90 As such, many regional 
human rights courts have held that states have an obligation to assess and disclose foreseeable environmental risks 
as part of their positive duties to protect, respect, and fulfill various human rights.91 This includes any environmental 
risks caused by government activity, as well as other environmental risks that threaten the exercise of human rights 
(since states have an obligation to protect rights against harms caused by third parties). 
86 See supra, note 59.
87 Mapping Report (2013), supra note 64, at p. 29.
88 HR Committee, General Comment No. 34, pp. 18-19, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011)
89 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14, 83, p. 204 (April 20).
90 See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, p.3, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (recognizing that the right to health “is closely related to and 
dependent upon the realization of other human rights” including access to information); Okechukwu Ibeanu, Special Rapporteur on the Adverse Effects 
of Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic Wastes on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 2, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/21 (Feb. 18, 2008) (noting that the rights to information and participation are 
“both rights in themselves and essential tools for the exercise of other rights, such as the right to life, the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, the right to adequate housing and others”).
91 See Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-xII European Court of Human Rights 1, p. 90 (deriving right to information from right to life); Taşkin v. Turkey, 2004-x Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 179, pp. 118, 119, 126 (deriving right to information from right to privacy and home life); Ogoniland Case (Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center v. Nigeria), Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Oct. 2011), 96 AJIL 937, para 53 (2002) 
(deriving right to information from the rights to health and a healthy environment); Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (2006) 
(deriving right to information from right to freedom of expression). 
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The UNFCCC outlines similar obligations with respect to assessing and disclosing information related to climate 
change. Specifically, Art. 4(1)(h) requires states to “[p]romote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange 
of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to the climate system 
and climate change, and to the economic and social consequences of various response strategies.” Art. 6 also 
directs the Parties to promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and regional levels, 
“public access to information on climate change and its effects.” Several other provisions direct the Parties to 
provide information on national GHG emissions and measures taken to address climate change and its effects.92
The right to information and corresponding obligation to acquire information through environmental impact 
assessments (EIA) and other mechanisms, and to communicate that information to the public, are also included 
in the Rio Declaration,93 the Aarhus Convention,94 the Espoo Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context, 
the Kyiv (SEA) Protocol, and a variety of other MEAs.95 The domestic laws of numerous states also contain such 
requirements.96
Several expert bodies have explicitly directed states to account for climate change when fulfilling their obligations 
to evaluate environmental risks and disclose environmental information to the public.97 For example, in Resolution 
65/178 (2011), the UN General Assembly called for urgent international, regional and national efforts to address 
the impacts of climate change on food security.98 And regarding the right to water, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has determined that State parties should establish mechanisms for assessing the 
impacts of climate change, desertification and other environmental harms on watersheds.99 
(ii) Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making
The UDHR (Art. 21) and ICCPR (Art. 25) both recognize the fundamental right of everyone to take part in the 
government of their country and in the conduct of public affairs. In addition, a variety of human rights treaty 
bodies have determined that governments have an obligation to facilitate public participation in environmental 
decision-making in order to protect human rights against environmental harm.100 The UNFCCC also directs states to 
promote and facilitate “public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate 
responses.”101 Other multilateral environmental instruments similarly provide for public participation.102 
92 UNFCCC Arts. 4(2)(b), 7(2)(b), 12.
93 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), Principles 10 and 17.
94 The Aarhus Convention outlines a comprehensive set of obligations relating to access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access 
to justice in environmental matters, and provides a useful gauge for a country’s compliance with obligations under other treaties (notably, the ICCPR). For 
example, the Convention defines “environmental information” for assessment and disclosure purposes; directs parties to take specific, affirmative steps 
to promote access to information. The Convention also restricts the circumstances under which governments may refuse a request for environmental 
information. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (“Aarhus 
Convention”), June 25, 1998, Arts. 3(2), 3(3), 4, 5.
95 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Art. 13; UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Art. 244; Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, Annex I; Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Arts. 5(d), 10(f); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Art. 9. 
96 According to a 2011 survey, 191 of the 193 member nations of the UN either have national legislation or have signed some form of international legal 
instrument that refers to the use of EIA. Richard K. Morgan, Environmental Impact Assessment: The State of the Art, 30 ImPaCt assessment and ProJeCt 
aPPraIsal 5 (2012).
97 In addition to the statements of the UN General Assembly and the CESCR, see Special Rapporteur Raquel Rolnik, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, p. 50, UN Doc. 
A/62/25 (Aug. 6, 2009).¶ 50, UN Doc. A/62/214 (Aug. 8, 2007) (“Informed and effective participation, in turn, requires that information about the 
mitigation targets and decisions related to those goals are managed transparently.”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani, p. 66, UN Doc. A/HRC/16/43 (Dec. 20, 2010) (“Urban dimensions of climate-change-induced displacement should be a 
key consideration in medium and long-term national development strategies, as well as adaptation measures. These should include strengthened systems 
to monitor influxes of IDPs, and to address the assistance and durable solutions needs of IDPs outside camps living in urban areas. IDPs, who are more 
likely to be unlisted and undocumented, are also likely to have less access to services and livelihoods, and to live in slum areas which are often situated in 
hazard-prone locations such as low-lying areas and landfill sites –thereby making them vulnerable to further risks, including to their physical safety, the loss 
of housing, and secondary displacement.”).
98 G.A. Res. 65/178, pp. 15, 26, UN Doc. A/Res/65/178 (March 24, 2011).
99 CESCR Comment No 15, p. 28, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
100 See, e.g., CESCR General Comment No. 15, p. 56, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (public participation required before any government or third 
party action that interferes with right to water); Mapping Report (2013), supra note 64, pp. 36-40. See also UN Doc. A/HRC/7/21 (Feb. 18, 2008), supra 
note 94, at ¶ 51 (Special Rapporteur Ibeanu calling for “public participation in the preparation of environmental plans, programmes, policies, laws and 
regulations, as well as the permitting of industrial, agricultural, and construction activities). 
101 UNFCCC Art 6. See also Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, p. 7; UNFCCC Decision 9/CP.13 Amended New Delhi work programme on Article, 
annex, p. 17(k), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2007).
102 See, e.g., Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Art. 10; CBD, supra note 99, Art. 14(1); CCD Arts. 3, 5, 19; Aarhus Convention, Arts. 6, 
7, 8. 
1 8
C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S
T H E  O B L I G A T I O N S  O F  G O V E R N M E N T S  A N D  P R I V A T E  A C T O R S  T O  R E S P O N D  T O  T H E  H U M A N 
R I G H T S  I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E
General Assembly Resolution 67/210 (2013) recognizes the “need to engage a broad range of stakeholders at 
the global, regional, national and local levels, including national, subnational and local governments, private 
businesses and civil society, and including youth and persons with disabilities, and that gender equality and the 
effective participation of women and indigenous peoples are important for effective action on all aspects of 
climate change.”
The precise standard of what constitutes “adequate” or “effective” public participation is not always clear. 
Terms such as “full and informed participation” and “meaningful consultation” are often used to describe this 
requirement. At a minimum, this requires: (1) assessment and disclosure of environmental impacts, as discussed 
above; (2) effective communication of those impacts—e.g., in a language and venue that is accessible to the 
persons who will be affected; and (3) an opportunity for affected persons to “voice their concerns.”103
It is particularly important to invite and facilitate public participation in decisions that affect vulnerable groups,104 
and for decisions concerning the displacement or resettlement of certain groups. OHCHR emphasizes that 
“adequate and meaningful consultation with affected persons should precede decisions to relocate people away 
from hazardous zones.”105 The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, has also 
contributed to this discussion by recommending certain obligations and good practices for States to address the 
impacts of climate change on migrants.106
(iii) Access to Administrative, Judicial, and Other Remedies
The UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR all recognize that states should provide an “effective remedy” for human rights 
violations. The respective human rights bodies for these treaties have clarified that such remedies extend to 
human rights violations caused by environmental harms. The obligation to provide access to justice and/or an 
effective remedy is also enshrined in the Rio Declaration, the Aarhus Convention, and a variety of other multilateral 
environmental and human rights agreements.107 
There is both a procedural and a substantive dimension to this obligation. First, states must provide access to 
administrative and judicial proceedings to adjudicate claims of human rights violation (the procedural element). 
But various expert bodies have asserted that states must also ensure that compensation or other forms of redress 
are available when violations do occur (the substantive dimension). The CESCR, for example, has noted that 
states should ensure that adequate compensation, alternative accommodation, and resettlement opportunities 
are provided to indigenous communities and other groups who are displaced by large infrastructure projects and 
deforestation.108 More generally, the former Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel Rolnik, has stated 
that human rights standards “require the existence of institutional forms of redress for grievances, compensation 
in response to inevitable damages and an evaluation of the distributional impacts of projects and effects.”109 
The UNFCCC does not explicitly recognize a right of access to justice or remedies for individuals. Article 14 outlines 
a procedure for the settlement of disputes between countries concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention.110 More notably, Paragraph 92 of the Cancun Agreements describes the need to consider “information 
from those affected, and evidence of actual impacts” of response measures (adaptation and mitigation).111 But the 
103 Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, p. 13, UN Doc. A/CONF.216/6 (2012).
104 See discussion, infra, section 2.2.3.
105 OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at p. 79. 
106 François Crépeau, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants to the General Assembly, pp. 39, 73-76, 79, 93, UN Doc. A/67/299 
(Aug. 13, 2012).
107 See, e.g., Rio Declaration, Principle 10; Aarhus Convention Art. 9; CBD, supra note 99, Art. 10(b).
108 See CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Mexico, p. 28, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEx/CO/4 (June 9, 2006); 
CESCR General Comment No. 15, p. 55, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). For a more detailed discussion of CESCR’s views on this, see Mapping 
Report (2013), supra note 64, Individual Report on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pp. 55-56 (Dec. 2013). 
109 Rolnik (2009), supra note 101, p. 50.
110 Specifically, Art.14 directs the country parties to settle such disputes “through negotiation or any other peaceful means” when possible, and allows 
parties to request that a “conciliation commission” be convened to issue a “recommendatory award” when such disputes have not been settled after 
twelve months. UNFCCC Art. 14(1), (5)-(6). Alternatively, the parties may issue a declaration consenting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and/or 
an independent arbitrator to settle such disputes. UNFCCC Art. 14(2). Notably, no countries have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ over such disputes, 
and only three countries (Netherlands, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu) have recognized arbitration as compulsory for the settlement of UNFCCC disputes, 
but the COP has yet to develop any procedures for the arbitration of disputes. UNFCCC, Declarations by Parties, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/items/5410.php (last viewed Oct. 19, 2015).
111 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86.
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COP has yet to establish any clear mandate for countries, climate finance mechanisms, or other entities to ensure 
access to a grievance mechanism for those who are harmed by the impacts of or responses to climate change. 
(b) Substantive Obligations
Both the ICESCR and ICCPR contain substantive rights, such as the rights to life, health, and an adequate standard 
of living, accompanied by a combination of: (i) negative obligations for states to refrain from taking action that 
would interfere with rights, (i.e., a duty to respect rights); and (ii) positive obligations for states to protect and fulfill 
rights.112 As noted by the UN General Assembly:
“Each state has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, inter alia, by adopting such steps as may be necessary to create all conditions 
necessary in the social, economic, political, and other fields, as well as the legal guarantees required to 
ensure that all persons under its jurisdiction, individually and in association with others, are able to enjoy 
all those rights and freedoms in practice.”113
Based on these obligations, the CESCR, regional courts, and UN special rapporteurs have concluded that states have 
a general duty to “adopt legal and institutional frameworks that protect against, and respond to, environmental 
harm that may or does interfere with the enjoyment of human rights.”114 The framework must ensure that the 
state will respect human rights in all of its activities and decisions, and include protections to prevent third parties 
from creating environmental harms that interfere with the exercise of human rights.115 In addition, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that states must also take reasonable measures to protect citizens against 
the reasonably foreseeable effects of natural disasters.116 
The adverse impacts of climate change clearly qualify as “environmental harms” that can interfere with the exercise 
of human rights. Thus, states must enact legal and institutional frameworks to protect against and respond to those 
impacts. More specifically, there are at least five types of obligations that may arise in this context: (1) adaptation 
obligations, requiring states to enact frameworks for protecting people against the effects of climate change; 
(2) domestic mitigation obligations, requiring states to regulate the sources of GHG emissions; (3) international 
cooperation obligations, requiring states to participate in international negotiations for an effective global climate 
agreement; (4) transboundary mitigation obligations, requiring states to mitigate the effect of their activities on 
the human rights of persons outside of their jurisdiction; and (5) an obligation to ensure that mitigation and 
adaptation activities do not themselves contribute to human rights violations. 
There are at least three overarching principles which apply to all of these obligations. First, states are “obliged to 
take measures towards the full realization of economic, social, and cultural rights to the maximum extent of their 
available resources.”117 This means that states “must take deliberate, concrete and targeted measures, making 
the most efficient use of available resources, to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
realization of rights.”118 
112 Regarding implementation, the ICESCR specifies that each party shall “take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation… 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to progressively achieving the full realization of” the rights contained therein. ICESCR Art. 2. 
The ICCPR contains slightly different language, requiring each party to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction” the rights recognized therein, and to “take the necessary steps…to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect” to 
those rights. ICCPR Art. 2, pp. (1)-(2). Based on this language, the treaty bodies have concluded that both agreements contain a combination of positive 
and negative obligations. HR Committee General Comment No. 31, pp.  5-7, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004); HRC General Comment No. 6, pp. 
1, 5, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994); CESCR General Comment No. 3, pp. 1-2 UN Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
113 G.A. Res. 53/144, Art. 2, p. 1, UN Doc. A/RES/53/144 (March 8, 1999).
114 Mapping Report, supra note 64, at pp. 47 (citing statements from these entities to support this proposition). See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, 
pp. 4, 15, 36, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (to achieve full realization of right to health, states must adopt measures to protect citizens from 
environmental hazards, and implement policies “aimed at reducing and eliminating pollution of air, water and soil”); Fadeyeva v. Russia, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
10 (2005); Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-xII European Court of Human Rights 1, ¶p. 89 (“The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life 
for the purposes of Article 2… entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.”); López Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994); Tştar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (Jan. 27, 2009); Ogoniland Case (2011), supra note 95; Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 98 (2003). See also Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (describing the protection of the environment as a 
“sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself”).
115 Mapping Report, supra note 64, at pp. 47-6.
116 See, e.g., Budayeva and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 15339/02, 21155/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 1543/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (March 20, 2008).
117 OHCHR Report (2009), supra note 71, at p. 75 (citing CESCR General Comment No. 3, pp. 1-2).
118 Id. at p. 76 (citing CESCR General comments No. 3 and No. 14).
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Second, although international human rights law generally requires the “progressive realization” of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, there are some obligations which require immediate implementation. For example, 
states must guarantee non-discrimination in access to economic, social and cultural rights, irrespective of resource 
constraints.119 States also have an immediate obligation to ensure, at the very least, “minimum essential levels” 
of each right that is enshrined in the ICESCR.120 In addition, states have an immediate obligation to refrain from 
undertaking actions that cause a violation of any human rights. 
Third, states have an obligation to protect all rights against third party abuses. As interpreted by the HR Committee, 
this means that states must “take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate 
or redress” any human rights violations caused by third parties.121
(i) Adaptation Obligations: Protecting Human Rights From Climate-Related Harms
Article 6 of the ICCPR recognizes that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life” and that no person 
“shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.” The HR Committee has noted that the right to life “should not be interpreted 
narrowly” and that “the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures” to protect life.122 
The ICESCR contains a number of additional rights—such as the rights to health and an adequate standard of 
living—which also require positive action from the state for their implementation.123
As discussed in Part 1, the effects of climate change will threaten the lives, health, well-being, and livelihoods of 
hundreds of millions if not billions of people in the coming decades. States have an obligation to enact legal and 
institutional frameworks to protect human rights against these effects. This is true regardless of whether the state 
is responsible for those effects because, as noted above, the ICCPR and ICESCR both include obligations to protect 
human rights from harms caused by third parties. Presumably, this would encompass a more pressing obligation 
to protect citizens from imminent, life-threatening harms (such as more severe storms and flooding), as well as 
an ongoing obligation to implement adaptation measures to alleviate the projected impacts of climate change on 
people and their livelihoods. 124 
The ECtHR has issued several decisions which, although not binding under the ICCPR or ICESCR, do provide insight 
on the nature of a state’s positive obligation to protect the human right to life in this context.125 For example, 
in Budayeva and Others v. Russia, the ECtHR determined that Russian authorities had violated the right to life 
when: (i) the authorities knew that there was a risk of a mud-slide, (ii) they did not implement land planning and 
emergency relief policies, (iii) they did not adequately inform the public about the risk; and (iv) eight citizens died as 
a result of the mud-slide.126 The Lahore High Court in Pakistan also recently issued a decision in which it held that 
the national government had violated the fundamental rights of its citizens, including the right to life, by failing to 
implement adaptation measures recommended in the 2012 National Climate Policy and Framework.127 
The UNFCCC does not recognize a right to adaptation, but it does call upon all parties to “[c]ooperate in preparing 
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for 
coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, 
119 CESCR General Comment No. 3, pp. 1-2, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
120 OHCHR Report (2009), supra note 71, at p. 76 (citing CESCR general comment No. 3).
121 HRC General Comment No. 31, p.8, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). See also CESCR, General Comment No. 12, p. 15, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 
(May 12, 1999); Knox (2014), supra note 76, at 7; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006); John H. Knox, Horizontal 
Human Rights Law (2008); velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988); Z and Others v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 3 (2002).
122 HR Committee General Comment No. 6, ¶¶ 1, 5, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
123 ICESCR Arts. 11, 12.
124 OHCHR acknowledges that, “in some cases, states may have an obligation to protect individuals against foreseeable threats to human rights related 
to climate change, such as an increased risk of flooding or storms in certain areas.” OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at p. 74. In another statement on 
disaster risk reduction and human rights obligations, OHCHR has also asserted that a failure “to take reasonable preventive action to reduce exposure and 
vulnerability and to enhance resilience, as well as to provide effective mitigation [to disasters]” is a “human rights issue.” OHCHR, Organization Profile: 
Policies and Programmes in DRR, http://www.preventionweb.net/organizations/1370/view (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). In addition, HRC Resolutions 10/4 and 
18/22 more assert that: “in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence” as a result of climate change impacts.”
125 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, supra note 95; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, supra note 120; Tştar v. Romania, supra note 118.
126 Budayeva and Others v. Russia, supra note 120. 
127  Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, Lahore High Court Green Bench (W.P. No. 25501/2015) (Sept. 15, 2015). Similarly, a district court in The Hague 
recently referred to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the right to life and corresponding obligation of governments to protect citizens from environmental 
harm in order to determine the “standard of care” that the Dutch national government must exercise to protect its citizens from climate-related harms. 
District Court of the Hague, Judgment: Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding the failure of the Dutch State to take sufficient 
actions to prevent dangerous climate change, p. 4.74 (Urgenda Foundation 2015).
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particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods.”128 In addition, it calls upon 
developed countries to provide assistance to developing countries to address the adverse effects of climate change 
in those countries.129 These directives complement the human rights obligations noted above.
The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-
2030), endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly,130 also outline a set of obligations for countries to 
build resilience of their citizens to disasters. The Sendai Framework explicitly recognizes that “[m]anaging the 
risks of disasters is aimed at protecting persons and their property, health, livelihoods and productive assets, as 
well as cultural and environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights, including the right to 
development.”131 It also recognizes that each state has the “primary responsibility” to take “effective measures to 
reduce disaster risk” within its jurisdiction.132 States can refer to the principles and directives outlined in the Sendai 
Framework in order to implement their human rights obligations with respect to climate-related disaster planning 
and risk reduction.
Finally, OHCHR notes that states are “legally bound to address [climate-related] vulnerabilities in accordance 
with the principle of equality and non-discrimination.”133 Specifically, the non-discrimination principle requires 
that states “identify marginalized or vulnerable individuals and groups; address specific needs through ‘targeted 
and differentiated interventions;’ and tackle underlying power imbalances and structural cases of ‘differential 
vulnerability’ within and between households while building the ecological resilience necessary to reduce 
vulnerability and achieve threshold needs.”134
128 UNFCCC Art. 4(1)(e).
129 UNFCCC Arr. 4(4).
130 A/RES/69/283, June 23, 2015.
131 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Part III, p. 19(c).
132 Id. at Part III, p. 13(b).
133 OHCHR, supra note 71, at p. 42.
134 fIsher (2014), supra note 49, at 11 (citing ELAN, Integrating Community and Ecosystem-Based Approaches in climate Change Adaption Responses (2012)).
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Although states have discretion to decide how to protect human rights against climate-related effects, taking into 
account their resource constraints and national contexts, there may be some minimum measures that would be 
required as a matter of international, regional, or domestic human rights law. These might include measures that 
are necessary to protect lives from imminent threats, such as early-warning systems and risk notification,135 which 
tie into the obligation to disclose information, discussed above; improvements to physical infrastructure to reduce 
the risk of floods or other hazards; emergency response plans; and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance in times of emergency.136 
Some of the UN Special Rapporteurs have further expanded upon the measures that states should take to protect 
human rights in the context of climate-related disasters and slow-onset degradation. Some of the proposed 
measures include:
• Urban Planning and Warning Systems: (1) Risk assessments in urban planning, rural development 
projects, and housing design (with a particular focus on vulnerable areas).137 (2) Establishing necessary 
infrastructure and services to prevent extreme weather events from becoming disasters.138 (3) Providing 
warning information to all neighborhoods to allow dwellers to seek protection and take risk reduction 
actions.139 (4) Providing access to “affordable and well-located land for the urban poor” in order to 
“avoid further unplanned settlement expansions” that contribute to climate change vulnerability.140
• Displacement and Resettlement: (1) Conducting risk assessments, providing public participation 
risk assessments, providing public participation opportunities, and ensuring that there are human 
rights safeguards for all programs to manage migration and displacement.141 (2) Ensuring adequate 
resettlement opportunities for those who are temporarily displaced by climate change-related 
disasters, and ensuring that “temporary relocation must last only as long as absolutely necessary 
and all displaced persons should have the right to return to their homes without discrimination.”142 
(3) Ensuring that the UNFCCC and related climate change frameworks address “the nexus between 
the effects of climate change and displacement” and that the least developed countries are provided 
with technical assistance, financial resources and/or other enhancements to domestic capacity to cope 
with climate-related displacement.143 (4) Adhering to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
which describe how human rights considerations should be incorporated into government actions to 
prevent and manage internal displacement.144
• Access to Food: (1) Addressing food shortages and price shocks that are caused or aggravated by 
climate related phenomena.145 (2) Developing social safety nets to ensure that those who are adversely 
affected by climate change (e.g., through displacement or loss of livelihoods) will have access to 
food.146
(ii) Domestic Mitigation Obligations
States may also have an obligation to respond to the core causes of climate change – anthropogenic emissions of 
GHGs and the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The CESCR, for example, has stated that State Parties to 
the ICESCR should mitigate the effects of climate change in order to safeguard the economic, social and cultural 
135 OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at p. 78. 
136 The CESCR has asserted that, to protect the right to health, parties to the ICESCR have a “joint and individual responsibility . . . to cooperate in providing 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons.” CESCR, General 
Comment No. 14, p. 40, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
137 Rolnik (2009), supra note 101, at ¶ 51.
138 Id.
139 Id. at p. 53.
140 Id. at p. 74.
141 Crépeau (2012), supra note 110, at 39, 73-76, 93.
142 Rolnik (2009), supra note 101, at 55.
143 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin, p. 84, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/21 
(Jan. 5, 2010).
144 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/43 (Dec. 20, 2010).
145 Id. See also, De Schutter (2008), supra note 45.
146 Id.
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rights of their citizens (although it has not expressly characterized this as an obligation).147 The former Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has also asserted that “Human rights standards require all countries to seek 
to reduce their harmful emissions to the global atmosphere, with a view to reducing their negative effect on the 
enjoyment of human rights.”148 The international human rights courts have not yet addressed the nature of a state’s 
obligations to mitigate GHG emissions, but there is at least one domestic case requiring a national government 
to accelerate its emission reduction efforts in order to fulfill a duty of care to its citizens,149 and another requiring 
the government to implement its national climate change policy (which included mitigation objectives) in order to 
protect the fundamental rights of its citizens.150 In addition, cases alleging a violation of fundamental rights as a 
result of governmental inaction on climate change have been filed in the United States151 and Belgium.152 
In this context, questions of causation are relevant. Many countries have made and are making relatively small 
contributions to climate change; their GHG emissions reductions will not significantly impact their peoples’ 
enjoyment of human rights. By contrast, emissions reductions by the U.S., China, the E.U. and other major emitters 
matter a great deal.153
The principles and goals set forth in the UNFCCC provide a useful frame for these mitigation obligations. For one 
thing, the treaty recognizes that all states share a duty to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the atmosphere” as necessary to “allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”154 In 
the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the COP agreed that, to achieve this goal, they must “hold the increase in global 
average temperature below 2°C e above pre-industrial levels,” and that they should consider strengthening this 
long-term goal so as to hold the global average temperature increase to 1.5°C.155 Many UN independent experts 
and other stakeholders feel that to protect fundamental human rights, it will be necessary to keep global warming 
well below the 2°C goal.156 Such an approach would accord with some of the core principles of many international 
environmental instruments (including the UNFCCC), such as the precautionary principle157 and intergenerational 
equity.158 
The UNFCCC also provides insight on how to allocate the responsibility for achieving this target. Under the principle 
of common-but-differentiated responsibilities, developed countries must take the lead in ensuring that we remain 
within the 2°C global warming goal established under the UNFCCC.159 However, developing countries also have an 
147 E.g., in Statement on the World Food Crisis, CESCR pressed State parties to adopt “strategies to combat global climate change that do not negatively 
affect the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger, but rather promote sustainable agriculture, as required by article 2 of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.” In Concluding Observations to Australia, it encouraged Australia “to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and to take 
all the necessary and adequate measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change, impacting the right to food and the right to water for 
indigenous peoples.” 
148  Rolnik (2009), supra note 101, at 45.
149 Urgenda decision, supra note 131.
150 Ashgar Leghari, supra note 131.
151 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 85, Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana, xiuhtezcatl Tonatiuh M. Et Al. v. United States, Barack Obama et 
al., No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015). This complaint and other recent cases in the U.S. also allege that federal and state governments have 
violated their public trust obligation by failing to adequately mitigate the GHG emissions that contribute to climate change. See, e.g., Foster v. Washington 
Department of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 (Wash Super. Ct., filed Sept. 2014); Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517 (D.Or., filed Aug. 2015). 
Although these cases have not yet been successful at compelling government action, they have resulted in at least one decision holding that the state 
government (New Mexico) had a public trust responsibility to protect the atmosphere (but the court also found that this responsibility had been met 
through compliance with the state air quality act). Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 2015-NMCA-063, 350 P.3d 1221 (March 12, 2015). Although these cases 
did not involve human rights claims, there is a clear relationship between governments’ public trust obligations—which require the maintenance and 
preservation of common environmental resources for the benefit of current and future generations—and governments’ human rights obligations. See 
burns h. Weston & daVId bollIer, green goVernanCe – eCologICal surVIVal, human rIghts, and the laW of the Commons (Cambridge University Press 2013); David 
Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 nyu enVtl. l.J. 711 (2008).
152 Summons to the Ministers of Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels, and the Federal State of Belgium (April 27, 2015), available at http://klimaatzaak.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/Dagvaarding.pdf.
153 Knox (2009), supra note 58, at 10-11. 
154 UNFCCC Art. 2.
155 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at ¶ 5.
156 See, e.g., A New Climate Change Agreement Must Include Human Rights Protections for All: An Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of 
the Human Rights Council to the State Parties to the UNFCCC on the occasion of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
enhanced Action in Bonn, 20-25 October 2014 (Oct. 17, 2014); Press Release, Climate vulnerable Forum, 20 Nations Call to Strengthen 2 Degrees Climate 
Goal (May 1, 2015), http://www.thecvf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/cvfpressrelease010515.pdf.
157 Hartmut Grassl & Bert Metz, Climate Change: Science and the Precautionary Principle, Ch. 14 in PreCautIonary PrInCIPle: late lessons from early WarnIngs: 
sCIenCe, PreCautIon, InnoVatIon, EEA Report No 1/2013.
158 Edward Cameron et al., Climate Justice: Equity and Justice Informing a New Climate Agreement, World Resources Institute and Mary Robinson Foundation 
Working Paper (Sept. 2013).
159 UNFCCC Art. 3(1).
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obligation to incorporate GHG mitigation goals into their development plans, laws, and policies.160 This approach 
accords with fundamental principles of equity, responsibility, and burden sharing.161 
Finally, the Oslo Principles, although not endorsed by the UN or binding on any states, contain a useful framework for 
conceptualizing state obligations in this context. The principles explicitly reference the need to protect human rights 
and clarify the obligations that states have to reduce GHG emissions, taking into account cost and other factors.162 
(iii) International Cooperation Obligations
The ICESCR requires parties to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.”163 The UDHR 
and ICCPR also recognize an obligation of states to “promote universal respect for, and observance of” human 
rights and freedoms.164 Finally, in the UN Charter, all UN member states “pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of [inter alia] universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.” 165 
Based on this language, both the CESCR and the OHCHR have concluded that states have an obligation to address 
the extraterritorial impacts of environmental harm caused by activities within their jurisdiction.166 These have been 
framed as “obligations of international cooperation,” and they require that states: 
• Refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries
160 UNFCCC Art. 4(2).
161 IPCC, Sustainable Development and Equity, Ch. 4 in ClImate Change 2014: mItIgatIon of ClImate Change, WorkIng grouP III ContrIbutIon to the fIfth assessment 
rePort of the IntergoVernmental Panel on ClImate Change 317-319 (2014).
162 Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations (2015).
163 ICESCR Art. 2.
164 UDHR Preamble; ICCPR Preamble. See also vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in vienna, 
June 25, 1993, Art. 1.
165 UN Charter p. 85. 
166 OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at ¶ 84-88; CESCR General Comment No. 3, ¶ 14, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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• Take measures to prevent third parties (e.g. private companies) over which they hold influence from 
interfering with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries
• Take steps through international assistance and cooperation, depending on the availability of resources, 
to facilitate fulfillment of human rights in other countries, including disaster relief, emergency 
assistance, and assistance to refugees and displaced persons 
• Ensure that human rights are given due attention in international agreements and that such agreements 
do not adversely impact upon human rights.167
The OHCHR has noted that these standards and principles are “consistent with and further emphasize” the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” contained in the UNFCCC,168 and the various provisions of 
the UNFCCC which call for international cooperation and financial and technical assistance between countries.169 
According to one author, the obligation of international cooperation would likely require the following actions from 
countries with respect to climate change: (i) setting mitigation targets that are consistent with the full enjoyment 
of human rights (and implementing those targets); (ii) funding adaptation measures in vulnerable countries; 
and (iii) crafting international agreements that do not adversely affect human rights.170 Other components of 
this obligation may include the provision of financial assistance and/or technology transfer for climate change 
mitigation measures in countries that lack resources to implement those measures, and compensating people for 
harm incurred as a result of climate change. 
(iv) Obligations to Address Transboundary Harm
States also have a duty to address transboundary environmental harms, which is closely related to, and partially 
premised on, their duties of international cooperation. This obligation also derives in part from customary 
international law, which primarily deals with a state’s obligations vis-à-vis other states, as opposed to a state’s 
obligations to individuals. 
The ICJ has clarified that, as a matter of customary international law, it is “every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”171 Specifically, there is a “principle 
of prevention” that requires a state to “use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take 
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another 
State.”172 The ICJ’s holding is consistent with the principle of sic utere (also known as the “no harm” rule).173
It is less clear whether states have an independent obligation, as a matter of international human rights law, to 
prevent transboundary harms where the harms originate from activities that occur within their own jurisdiction 
but have adverse effects on the enjoyment of human rights in other jurisdictions. As noted above, the CESCR has 
interpreted the ICESCR as encompassing extraterritorial obligations of this nature. The language of the convention 
strongly supports this interpretation—states are directed to cooperate internationally, and to use the maximum 
available resources, to protect the numerated human rights for all persons.174 There is no jurisdictional limitation. 
However, many developed countries have disagreed with this interpretation, and thus there is not a clear consensus 
on the extraterritorial application of the convention.175 
167 OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at ¶ 86 (citing CESCR General Comments No. 12, No. 13, No. 14, No. 15).
168 Id. at ¶ 87 (citing UNFCCC Art. 4, pp. 4 and 9). 
169 These include: Article 3(5), which recognizes that Parties “should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would 
lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them to better address the 
problems of climate change;” Article 4(1)(c), which specifies that Parties should “[p]romote and cooperate in the development, application, and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions” of GHGs; and Article 4(1)(e), which 
directs parties to “[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change,” by developing integrated resource management and 
protection plans, among other things.
170 Mark Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action, 33 harV. enVtl. l. reV. 439, 455 (2009).
171 Pulp Mills Case (2010), supra note 93, at p. 101 (citing Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment (1949)). See also Trail Smelter 
(United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1963 (Mar. 11, 1941) (“no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury… in or to the territory of another or of the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence”).
172 Id. at 56, citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, p. 29 (1996)).
173 Marte Jervan, The Prohibition of Transboundary Environmental Harm. An Analysis of the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the 
Development of the No-harm Rule, PluriCourts Research Paper No. 14-17 (2014).
174 ICESCR Art. 2.
175 Matthew Craven, The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in eConomIC, soCIal and Cultural rIghts In 
aCtIon (M.A. Baderin & R. McCorquodale eds. 2007).
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Unlike the ICESCR, the ICCPR does include a jurisdictional limit. Specifically, it directs each party “to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” the rights recognized therein.176 The 
HR Committee has interpreted this as requiring states to respect and ensure civil and political rights for all persons 
within their “effective control.”177 For example, the Committee has noted that a state may not actively violate the 
right to life of persons detained abroad, noting that:
“It would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit 
a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it 
could not perpetrate on its own territory.”178
However, the Committee has not held that a state has an obligation to protect the right to life of persons outside 
of its jurisdiction against harms caused by activities within its jurisdiction, and it would be a stretch to say that the 
“effective control” standard encompasses such situations. That said, there are several HR Committee resolutions 
that recognize the importance of international cooperation in this context, without explicitly recognizing an 
obligation of international cooperation.179
The idea that states have extraterritorial obligations to prevent transboundary environmental harm is supported 
by other international declarations and statements from authoritative bodies. For example, Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration provides that states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”180 More generally, the UNFCCC and other MEAs all recognize that states have obligations to address 
the effect of their activities on global resources, such as the climate, oceans, and biodiversity.181 Indeed, the 
UNFCCC’s principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is premised on the idea that the states most 
responsible for climate change must take the lead in order to address the adverse effects of climate change on 
ecosystems and people across the world, not just their own citizens.
(v) Safeguarding Human Rights in Mitigation and Adaptation Activities
Finally, international law requires states and other governmental actors to ensure that the actions they undertake 
to mitigate or adapt to climate change do not violate human rights, as part of their duty to respect human rights.
This obligation applies to both specific projects and broader policy decisions. For example, in the CESCR Statement 
on the World Food Crisis, the Committee “urge[d] State parties to address the structural causes at the national 
and international levels, including by . . . [i]mplementing strategies to combat global climate change that do 
not negatively affect the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger, but rather promote sustainable 
agriculture, as required by Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”182 CESCR’s 
recommendation in this context was no doubt informed by concerns about biofuel projects and their impact on 
food security.
176 ICCPR Art. 2, p. (1).
177 HR Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal obligation on State parties to the Covenant, p. 10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (2004).
178 101 (1981) ICCPR Comm. No. 52/1979, p. 12.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1981). See also Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, ICCPR Comm. No. 
56/1979 (1981).
179 See, e.g., UNHRC Res. 18/22, supra note 82, stated that “climate change is a global problem requiring a global solution, and that effective international 
cooperation to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in accordance 
with the provisions and principles of the Convention is important in order to support national efforts for the realization of human rights implicated by 
climate change-related impacts.” Resolution 26/27, supra note 83, provided that “the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.” / “the need of giving due consideration in the 
elaboration of the Post 2015 development agenda to the role of international cooperation in relation to the special needs and particular circumstances of 
developing countries and to addressing the adverse impact of climate change on the full and effective realization of human rights.” / climate change is an 
urgent global problem requiring a global solution, and that effective international cooperation to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention is important in order 
to support national efforts for the realization of human rights affected by climate change-related impact.
180 In addition, the Maastricht Principles, although not legally binding, provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the extraterritorial obligations 
of states in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights. They do not, however, provide detailed information on extraterritorial obligations related to 
environmental harms or climate change. Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2013).
181 See, e.g., CBD, supra note 99, Arts. 5, 10; 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Art. 2 UNCLOS, supra note 99, Art. 145.
182 CESCR Statement on the World Food Crisis, pp. 12-13, UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/1 (May 18, 2008).
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The UNFCCC COP also explicitly recognized this issue in Art. 8 of the Cancun Agreements, which recognize that 
the Parties “should, in all climate change-related actions, fully respect human rights as enunciated in the outcome 
of the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention.”183 UNHRC Resolutions 18/22 and 
26/27 include similar language.184 
The Cancun Agreements also include several paragraphs outlining principles for how Parties should address and 
mitigate the “economic and social consequences of response measures” on vulnerable groups and developing 
countries. For example, paragraph 89 urges developed country Parties to:
“strive to implement policies and measures to respond to climate change in such a way as to avoid 
negative social and economic consequences for developing country Parties, taking into account Article 
3 of the Convention, and to assist these Parties to address such consequences by providing support, 
including financial resources, transfer of technology and capacity-building, in accordance with Article 4 
of the Convention, to build up the resilience of societies and economies negatively affected by response 
measures.”185
Appendix I of the Cancun Agreements also outlines a set of safeguards for protecting vulnerable groups in the 
context of mitigation actions in the forest sector. These safeguards are evaluated in Part 3.
(c) Obligations to Specific Groups
The principle of non-discrimination is included in the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.186 In accordance with this 
principle, countries must ensure that the measures they take to address climate change (and the measures they 
take to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights) are implemented in a non-discriminatory fashion. These and other 
agreements also recognize that individuals who are part of certain groups—notably, women, indigenous groups, 
and children—are entitled to special protections. 
The UNFCCC does not speak of specific individuals or groups, but does recognize that some countries and 
ecosystems may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and as such, they warrant special 
consideration and adaptation assistance.187 In addition, the Cancun Agreements provide more detailed instructions 
on how the parties should address the impacts of climate change on people who are vulnerable to climate change 
as a result of geography, gender, age, indigenous or minority status, and disability.188
(i) Women
The Cancun Agreements recognize that gender equality and the effective participation of women are important 
for effective action on all aspects of climate change.189 They also discuss the need to address gender considerations 
in the implementation of REDD projects.190 However, they do not outline any specific requirements for countries 
to ensure that women are adequately involved in the various phases of government decision-making related to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, or to address the potentially discriminatory effect of certain actions on 
women.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) provides a more 
detailed framework for protecting the rights of women and ensuring that they have a voice in public decisions.191 
However, the Convention is more geared towards preventing acts of overt discrimination, as opposed to addressing 
the discriminatory effects of actions on women. As such, the Convention does not provide much guidance on 
government obligations relating to the disproportionate burden that women will likely experience as a result of 
climate change. 
183 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at p. 8.
184 UNHRC Res. 18/22, supra note 82; UNHRC Res. 26/27, supra note 83.
185 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at p. 89.
186 ICESCR Art. 2(2); ICCPR Art. 26; UDHR Art. 7.
187 UNFCCC Arts. 3(2), 4(4), 4(10).
188 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at pp. 7, 12, 18, 
189 Id. at p. 7.
190 Id. at p. 72.
191 For example, Art. 14(2) of the Convention mandates “all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order… that 
they participate in and benefit from rural development,” and requires participation “at all levels” as well as access to adequate living conditions.
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(ii) Children 
The Cancun Agreements recognize the need to “fully account” for the adverse effects of climate change on 
children,192 but do not contain additional instructions on how countries should do this. The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child outlines a variety of additional requirements that are relevant to the protection of children in 
the context of climate change. Article 24 is most relevant—it recognizes the “right of the child to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health” and outlines how states should ensure full implementation of the right. 
For example, states “shall take appropriate measures” to “combat disease and malnutrition, including within the 
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through 
the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and 
risks of environmental pollution.”193
In addition, the CESCR has directed states to “adopt comprehensive and integrated strategies and programmes 
to ensure that there is sufficient and safe water for present and future generations.”194 The UNFCCC also has an 
intergenerational focus, with the Parties agreeing that they “should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind.”195 
(iii) Indigenous Peoples
OHCHR has recognized that climate change “poses a serious threat to indigenous peoples, who often live in 
marginal lands and fragile ecosystems which are particularly sensitive to alterations in the physical environment.”196 
This threat could potentially undermine the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples, which is recognized 
in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR,197 as well as the rights outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. The Cancun Agreements explicitly refer to indigenous rights, and call for public participation of indigenous 
peoples in decisions about forestry and land use projects.198
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains particularly robust requirements for states to 
engage and obtain consent from indigenous peoples before undertaking actions that will adversely affect those 
peoples. For example, it specifies that indigenous peoples shall not be relocated from their lands or territories 
without “free, prior and informed consent… and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, with the option of return.”199 It also requires states to provide redress measures in the event that land 
or property is taken from these people without their consent.200 These provisions are particularly relevant when 
governments are implementing or authorizing mitigation and adaptation projects that will affect lands or resources 
owned or used by indigenous peoples. Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has decided several 
cases involving the obligation to protect indigenous rights in the context of projects that affect indigenous lands 
and resources that would appear applicable in these circumstances.201
In addition, the Declaration recognizes that “Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, 
peace and security” and a corresponding right “not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their 
culture.”202 Climate change will likely have a devastating effect on many of the ecosystems that indigenous people 
rely on for their livelihoods and cultural identity, and as such, the effects of climate change could be construed 
as a violation of this principle.203 Although it may be difficult to establish causation for the purposes of bringing 
a successful claim before an international or regional human rights court, it is nonetheless reasonable that major 
emitters do have an obligation to curtail their emissions so as to avoid the destruction of indigenous cultures.
192 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at Section E (preamble). 
193 CRC Art. 25(2)(c).
194 CESCR General Comment No. 15, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
195 UNFCCC Art. 3(1).
196 OHCHR (2009), supra note 71, at p. 68.
197 ICCPR Art. 1, ICESCR Art. 1
198 See, e.g., Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at Section E (preamble), p. 72.
199 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Art. 10.
200 Id. Arts. 8, 11.
201 See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Surin, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, para. 95(Nov. 28, 2007); Indigenous Cmty. Yakye Axa v. Para., Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 146, para. 143 (June 17, 2005); Maya Indigenous Cmty. Of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Response No. 
40/04, OEA/SEr.L/v/II.122 doc. 5 rev., para. 113 (2004); Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79, para. 148 
(Aug. 31, 2001).
202 Id. Arts. 7 and 8.
203 See Inuit Petition (2005), supra note 7.
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2.3 Private Sector Obligations to Address the Human Rights Implications of Climate 
Change
As discussed above, states have an obligation to protect human rights against abuses by third parties, as well as 
an obligation to provide access to an adequate remedy, judicial or non-judicial, when human rights are violated by 
non-state actors.
The core international human rights treaties do not directly address the obligations of private parties to respect 
human rights, but there are some standards for non-state actors that countries are beginning to incorporate into 
domestic law. These standards are enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the 
“Ruggie Principles”), proposed by UN Special Representative John Ruggie and endorsed by the UN Human Rights 
Council in June 2011.204 The Ruggie Principles provide additional guidance to countries on how to fulfill their 
obligations in this context, as well as principles that are directly applicable to private actors. The foundational 
principles for private actors include, inter alia:
1. Businesses should respect human rights by avoiding infringing on the human rights of others and 
addressing any adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.
2. The rights that must be respected by businesses include, at minimum, the rights recognized in the 
International Bill of Rights (UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR) and the principles concerning fundamental rights 
set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.
3. To meet their human rights responsibilities, businesses should implement policies and processes 
appropriate for their size and circumstances, so as to safeguard human rights in all aspects of their 
operation.
4. Businesses should also carry out human rights due diligence, which includes assessing actual and 
potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
communicating how impacts are addressed.
5. Where businesses identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should 
provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes.205
A complete assessment of non-state actors’ obligations is beyond the scope of this report, but it is worth noting 
that non-state obligations with respect to human rights are also outlined in the Oslo Principles (which deal 
specifically with climate change).206 In addition, the International Bar Association (IBA) published a recent report 
on advancing climate justice which contains recommendations on how corporations can implement the Ruggie 
Principles through the implementation of corporate responsibility policies and other actions.207
204 UNHRC Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/17/4 (July 6, 2011).
205 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Part II: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights (2011).
206 Oslo Principles, pp. 27-30.
207 Iba PresIdentIal task forCe on ClImate Change JustICe and human rIghts, aChIeVIng JustICe and human rIghts In an era of ClImate dIsruPtIon (2014).
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Implementation Assessment
The parties to the UNFCCC have taken many important steps, both individually and jointly, to address the causes and 
impacts of climate change. However, it appears that there is still a need to mainstream human rights considerations 
into the decisions of individual countries, the COP and the UNFCCC’s various arms and mechanisms, and to 
undertake additional measures to address the effect of climate change on human rights. 
This section will briefly evaluate the adequacy of national and international responses in six contexts: (1) formal 
recognition of the human rights-climate change nexus in national communications; (2) mitigation actions and 
commitments; (3) adaptation actions and commitments; (4) financial assistance to developing countries; (5) 
respect for procedural rights in climate policy and planning; and (6) safeguards in international climate finance 
mechanisms.
3.1 Human Rights and Climate Change in National Communications
As of Oct. 5, 2015, 119 INDCs had been submitted, covering 146 countries.208 Among these,
• 14 discussed the linkages between climate change and human rights.209 
• 48 discussed gender equality, mainstreaming, and empowerment.210
208 Center for International Environmental Law, Briefing Note: Human Rights and the 2015 Climate Commitments (November 2015), available at www.ciel.
org.
209 These countries include: Brazil, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, 
Zimbabwe. Id.
210 These countries include: Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Rep, Chad, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Rep., DR Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tajikistan, vanuatu, vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Id.
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Additional investment in flood protection will be needed to address the impacts of rising sea levels and increased precipitation in Manila, the capital 
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• 14 discussed the impact of climate change and mitigation and/or adaptation responses on indigenous 
peoples.211
Notably, all of the INDCs that discuss any of these three topics were submitted by developing countries and least 
developed countries. These countries often noted the need to implement their mitigation and adaptation targets 
with full respect for human rights or related issues (e.g., gender equality, indigenous rights), without providing 
much detail on how this would occur.212 The INDCs submitted by developed countries do not mention human 
rights, gender, indigenous peoples, or other relevant considerations (e.g., equity, poverty alleviation, and ensuring 
access to basic goods and services).213
A report published by the Mary Robinson Foundation in 2014 also concluded that the majority of country reports 
to the UNFCCC and the UNHRC do not address the link between human rights and climate change.214 Some of 
the key findings from that report included:
• 49 countries explicitly mentioned human rights in National Communications and National Adaptation 
Plans of Action (NAPAs) submitted to the UNFCCC between 2010 and 2014. This included 39% of the 
National Communications and 4% of the NAPAs that were submitted during that period.215 
• Procedural rights were more frequently discussed than substantive rights in the National Communications 
submitted to the UNFCCC. 20% of these communications discussed procedural rights (10% developed/ 
10% developing), and 13% discussed substantive rights (1% developed/12% developing).216
• 45 countries explicitly mentioned the human rights impact of climate change in their national reports 
to the Universal Periodic Review of the HRC between 2010 and 2014. These included 12% of the 
submissions from developed countries, 29% of the submissions from developing countries, 32% of 
submissions from least developed countries (LDCs), and 45% of the submissions from small island 
development states (SIDS).217
• Only 12 countries made the link between human rights and climate change in reports to both the 
UNFCCC and the HRC.218 
The report concluded that further steps are needed to ensure that countries will integrate human rights 
considerations into their climate policies, and also account for climate change when reporting on human rights 
performance. 
While the failure to report on the linkages between human rights and climate change is not itself a violation of 
human rights obligations, it does suggest that many countries are not thinking about these obligations when 
formulating climate change plans and policies. It also makes it more difficult for the international community to 
assess what countries are doing to address the human rights implications of climate change. 
3.2 Mitigation Measures and Commitments
The “emissions gap”— the gap between the aggregate effect of actions and commitments by parties to the 
UNFCCC and the emissions reductions required to keep warming at or below 2°C219—is a major concern from 
a human rights perspective. The parties have significantly increased their mitigation ambition in the lead-up to 
the Paris Agreement. But there is more to be done. Moreover, many countries dispute whether the 2°C is really 
adequate to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the atmosphere and the natural systems that 
211 These countries include: Brazil, Cameroon, Central African Rep, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Lao, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, 
vietnam, Zimbabwe. Id.
212 See, e.g., Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 1 (2015); Government of Costa Rica, Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, Costa Rica’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 11 (2015).
213 See, e.g., INDCs submitted by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States. 
214 Mary Robinson Foundation, Incorporating Human Rights into Climate Action (Oct. 2014).
215 Id. at 4.
216 Id. The report also noted that parties to the Aarhus Convention (predominantly developed countries) were 4 times more likely to refer to the right to 
access to information, which implies that the Aarhus Convention is “successful at promoting the inclusion of human rights in policy making.”
217 Id. at 5.
218 Id. at 6.
219 uneP, the emIssIons gaP rePort (2015).
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support human life220—indeed, based on the IPCC’s analysis (summarized in Part 1), an increase of this magnitude 
will have environmental impacts that seriously interfere with human rights for millions and perhaps even billions 
of people across the world.
In November 2015 UNEP published its sixth Emissions Gap Report which provides a scientific assessment of the 
mitigation contributions from submitted INDCs, and compares this with the mitigation levels required to meet 
the target of a global average temperature increase below 2°C by 2100.221 The assessment covers 119 submitted 
INDCs, representing 146 countries and 85-88 per cent of global emissions.
The assessment determined that full implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs will result in 
emission level estimates in 2030 that are most consistent with scenarios that limit global average temperature 
increase to below 3-3.5°C with a greater than 66 per cent chance.222 Therefore although the INDCs do present a 
real increase in the ambition level compared to a projection of current policies, there is still a large emissions gap 
in 2030 of 12GtCO2e (with a range of 10-15).
223
In light of these findings, there is a clear need to continue increasing ambition with respect to global GHG mitigation. 
Thus, many countries have called for inclusion of a mechanism for gradually “ratcheting down” emissions (or 
“ramping up ambition”) in the upcoming Paris agreement.224 Such a mechanism could contribute to mitigation 
ambition, although it may not go far enough to protect human rights from climate-related harms. If emissions are 
not significantly lowered beneath the current commitments, there will almost certainly be environmental impacts 
that result in widespread interference with human rights. Indeed, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report confirmed 
that, to have a “likely” chance of limiting warming to 2°C, we must see “substantial emissions reductions over the 
next few decades, and near zero emissions… by the end of the century.”225 Thus, national governments and other 
actors must seek pathways to a zero-carbon economy.
3.3 Adaptation Measures and Commitments
Considerable investments will be required in both developed and developing countries to adapt to climate change. 
Even the richest countries have yet to enact adequate legal and institutional frameworks for climate change 
adaptation, and will face serious challenges in terms of mobilizing resources and building adaptive capacity among 
their citizens, economic sectors, and infrastructure.226 But there is no question that developing countries—and in 
particular, least developed countries (LDCs) and geographically vulnerable countries (e.g., small island states)—face 
the greatest adaptation challenges. 
In 2014, UNEP published the Global Adaptation Gap Report which found that there is likely to be a significant 
gap between the resources that would be needed to adapt to 2°C of warming and the funding that will be made 
available through international climate funds and other finance mechanisms.227 The report cited evidence that 
financial commitments to adaptation have increased in recent years, and that a significant amount of adaptation 
funding flows to developing countries.228 However, it also noted a serious need to scale up adaptation funding, 
and that the existing estimates of global adaptation costs (ranging from US$70 billion-$100 billion per year) 
are likely to be a significant underestimate, particularly in the period after 2030.229 The bulk of international 
climate finance to developing countries in the past few years has been channeled towards mitigation, rather than 
adaptation (see discussion below). In this context, the decision of the Green Climate Fund to allocate funds 50/50 
between mitigation and adaptation is welcome.
220 Petra Tschakert, 1.5°C or 2°C: A Conduit’s View from the Science-Policy Interface at COP20 in Lima, Peru, 2 ClImate Change resPonses 1 (2015). 
221 UNEP, the emIssIons gaP rePort (2015).
222 Id. at xvIII.
223 Id. (Based on full implementation of conditional and unconditional INDCs).
224 Both the U.S. and China have supported language to this effect. For more on this issue, see Commitment Cycles and the Ratchet Mechanism, The Road to 
Paris, Climate Nexus (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.theroadthroughparis.org/negotiation-issues/commitment-cycles-and-ratchet-mechanism.
225 IPCC, ClImate Change 2014, synthesIs rePort, summary of PolICymakers 20 (2014).
226 IPCC (2014), supra note 4, highlights numerous examples of where adaptive capacity is lacking in both developed and developing countries, although 
it ultimately concludes that developed countries will fare better than developing countries. See also ChrIstIan kroll, sustaInable goVernanCe IndICators (sgI), 
sustaInable deVeloPment goals: are the rICh CountrIes ready? (2015) (concluding that 34 OECD countries are not ready to meet the sustainable development 
goals, including goals related to climate change adaptation); nICholas stern, stern reVIeW: the eConomICs of ClImate Change 413 (Cambridge University Press 
2007) (“Even with an appropriate policy framework, adaptation will be constrained by both uncertainty and technical limits to adaptation.”)
227 UNEP, the adaPtatIon gaP: a PrelImInary assessment (2014). 
228 Id. at xIII.
229 Id.
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The UNEP Global Adaptation Report also highlighted other key barriers to adaptation in developing countries, 
including lack of access to technologies and limitations in existing technologies, lack of knowledge about the 
impacts of climate change and the effectiveness of various adaptation measures, and problems with institutional 
capacity and governance in some countries. Even if countries increase their mitigation ambition and can limit 
warming to 2°C, it will be challenging for many countries to fulfill human rights obligations related to climate 
change adaptation.
3.4 Financial and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries
In the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to a goal of mobilizing US$100 billion per year 
by 2020 to “address the needs of developing countries” in the context of “meaningful mitigation actions and 
transparency on implementation”230 The expectation was that this funding would come from a variety of public 
and private sources (not just foreign aid).231 This commitment was reaffirmed in the 2010 Cancun Agreements.232 
The Cancun Agreements also called for the creation of a Green Climate Fund (GCF),233 with the stated objective of 
“achieving a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.”234 The draft negotiating text for the Paris 
Agreement contains proposed text for scaling up finance after 2020, but does not specify a numeric target for 
this goal.235
As of October 2, 2015, a total of 37 governments had made pledges to the GCF, amounting to US$10.2 billion 
(including $5.8 billion in signed pledges, and $4.4 billion in announced but not signed pledges). 236 Thus, the 
aggregate amount of the pledges (which are not annual pledges), is far below the $100 billion annual target. 
Moreover, the countries have not yet made financial commitments or mobilized any resources for loss and damage 
caused by the effects of climate change.
However, a recent OECD report determined that many more funds have been mobilized outside of the context 
of the GCF.237 Specifically, the report concluded that developed countries had mobilized an average of US$57 
billion per year in 2013-2014 for public and private climate finance in developing countries.238 This figure excludes 
the pledges that developed countries have made to the GCF. Notably, 77% of the mobilized climate finance 
addressed climate change mitigation only, 16% addressed adaptation only, and 7% consisted of activities designed 
to address both mitigation and adaptation.239 This data reinforces one key concern of developing countries—
that international climate finance will prioritize mitigation over adaptation—and lends support to the idea that 
climate finance should be channeled through a global facility, like the GCF, to ensure that funds are more equally 
distributed between adaptation and mitigation.
Even if the COP does meet its goal of mobilizing $100 billion in climate finance annually, this will not be adequate 
to address the effect of climate change on human rights. As noted by the World Resources Institute, $100 billion is 
“only a fraction of the finance needed to keep the average temperature increase to 2°C,”240 and clearly insufficient 
to meet both adaptation and mitigation needs in developing countries.
On a more positive note, there are some promising examples of state action aimed at providing technical assistance 
to developing countries and addressing the transboundary impacts of climate change. For example, in October 
2014, 110 countries endorsed the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, which calls for additional research on 
international displacement caused by natural disasters, including climate-related disasters, and which directs 
countries to make better use of humanitarian measures to help those displaced across borders.241 
230 UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 8, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (March 30, 2010). 
231 Id.
232 Cancun Agreements (2011), supra note 86, at ¶ 98.
233 Id. at ¶ 100-112. The Agreements did not, however, announce a separate target for adaptation funding—as a result, it is unclear whether the COP 
intended to raise $100 billion to finance both mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, or if additional funds will be mobilized for adaptation.
234 Id., Appendix III, ¶1(c)..
235 Draft Agreement, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Article 6: Finance, ¶ 5, UN Doc ADP.2015.8.Informal Note, 
Section F, Finance.
236 Green Climate Fund Pledge Tracker, Status of Pledges and Contributions made to the Green Climate Fund (Oct. 1, 2015).
237 oeCd, ClImate fInanCe In 2013-14 and the usd 100 bIllIon goal (2015).
238 Id. at 10.
239 Id. at 28.
240 mIChael I. WestPhal et al., WrI, gettIng to $100 bIllIon: ClImate fInanCe sCenarIos and ProJeCtIons to 2020 5 (May 2015)
241 Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (2015).
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Nonetheless, to fulfill their human rights obligations relating to international cooperation and transboundary harm, 
developed countries should increase the amount of financial assistance that is provided to developing countries. 
They should also seek to achieve a more equitable balance between adaptation and mitigation funding, especially 
in light of current emissions trajectories. 
3.5 Respect for Procedural Rights in Climate Policies and Planning
A complete overview of procedural safeguards for national adaptation and mitigation measures is beyond the 
scope of this report. But there are a few trends worth highlighting.
One of the most important developments occurred in 1992, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. Principle 10 stated that:
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At 
the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment 
that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.242
The outcome document for Rio+20, The Future We Want, reaffirmed that “broad public participation and 
access to information and judicial and administrative proceedings are essential to the promotion of sustainable 
development.”243 Countries across the world have taken important steps towards implementing these principles in 
environmental decision-making,244 and this seems to be the case for climate-related decisions as well.
For example, it appears that many countries are making reasonable efforts to assess the impacts of climate change, 
as well as the contribution of their activities to climate change, and make this information available to the public. 
This includes efforts to: (1) monitor and disclose domestic sources of GHG emissions, in accordance with Annex 
I of the UNFCCC; (2) inform the public about the potential impacts and risks associated with climate change; 245 
(3) describe and evaluate efforts to respond to climate change;246 and (4) use existing EIA procedures to inform 
decision-makers and the public about the contribution of a proposed action to global GHG emissions, as well as 
the potential impacts of climate change on those proposals.247 
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which governments are promoting public participation in decisions that involve 
climate change, for instance major projects that generate GHG emissions or the development of local, regional and 
national adaptation plans. National progress in this context relates to the broader issue of public participation in 
local, regional and national governance, and accordingly with general implementation of the rule of law in nations 
around the world. There is evidence that, as a general matter, many states have taken important steps towards 
promoting public participation in environmental decision-making.248 This appears to be the case for climate-related 
decisions as well. For example, one study found that many European countries have mechanisms in place to ensure 
that affected stakeholders are informed about climate-related decisions and that they can provide input on those 
decisions. 249 However, the same study found that government decision-makers should be more proactive about 
242 UN GA, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
243 UN GA Res. 66/288, The Future We Want, p. 43, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288 (July 7, 2012).
244 stakeholder forum for a sustaInable future, reVIeW of ImPlementatIon of agenda 21 and the rIo PrInCIPles 43 (Jan. 2012) (finding that the implementation of 
Principle 10 has been “very successful in some regions, and looks set to secure successful implementation in others”).
245 See, e.g., u.s. global Change researCh Program, natIonal ClImate assessment (2014); uk ClImate Change rIsk assessment: goVernment rePort (2012); australIan 
dePartment of enVIronment, ClImate adaPtatIon outlook: a ProPosed natIonal adaPtatIon assessment frameWork (2013).
246 See, e.g., the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs), and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs) submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
247 See Morgan (2012) supra note 100. Promisingly, many jurisdictions have developed policies or guidance for integrating climate change considerations into 
strategic and project-level EIA, to address both the contribution of proposed actions on climate change and the potential impact of climate change on 
those projects. However, in some jurisdictions, EIA documents do not thoroughly assess the GHG emissions from activities and/or the impacts of climate 
change on the project. See Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Climate Change and Environmental Impact Assessment, http://web.law.columbia.edu/
climate-change/resources/nepa-and-state-nepa-eis-resource-center (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (website includes list of guidance documents from the U.S. 
and other jurisdictions, as well as assessments of climate change considerations in U.S. EIA).
248 See John Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment – Compilation of Good Practices, Parts A-C, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/61 (Feb. 3, 2015).
249 Mara Silina, European Environmental Bureau & European ECO Forum, Is Everything Right with Public Participation in Climate Related Decisions? 
Presentation for the Fifth Meeting of the Task Force on Public Participation in Decision-making, Geneva, February 23-24, 2015. 
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soliciting input from affected stakeholders, and actually incorporating the information and perspectives gathered 
through public consultation processes into final decisions.250
Finally, perhaps the largest procedural gap in this context is the lack of access to justice and remedies for climate-
related harms. In both domestic courts and international tribunals, many cases alleging serious injury to human 
rights caused by the effects of climate change have been dismissed or have failed due to: (i) the challenge of 
establishing a causal link between specific emitters and climate change; (ii) the challenge of establishing a causal 
link between climate change and the on-the-ground impacts that gave rise to the harm; and/or (iii) the absence 
of legal requirements or liability for GHG emissions.251 Jurisdiction (or lack thereof) also poses a major barrier to 
judicial remedies, especially in the context of transboundary harms. Moreover, there is no international grievance 
mechanism that would provide an alternative forum for justice and remedies in this context—although many 
developing countries would like to see a Loss and Damage Framework developed under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC that could fill this role.252
One way for countries to implement and further elaborate upon their procedural human rights obligations is 
through participation in MEAs. As of 2015, there are 47 parties to the Aarhus Convention, which include virtually 
all of the countries in Europe as well as several countries in Central Asia.253 In addition, nineteen countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are currently negotiating a new regional agreement to implement the access rights 
set forth in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.254 Other actors are also using international mechanisms to give 
effect to procedural rights—for example, in 2010, the UNEP Governing Council adopted the Bali Guidelines for 
250 Id.
251 See, e.g., Inuit Petition (2005), supra note 7; Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Litigation Charts, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/
resources/litigation-charts (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
252 For a detailed discussion of barriers to justice in this context, see Iba (2014), supra note 211.
253 UNECE, Status of Ratification, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
254 Press Release, ECLAC, LAC Countries Hold First Negotiating Committee Meeting on Principle 10 of Rio Declaration, May 7, 2015.







C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  A N D  H U M A N  R I G H T S
I M P L E M E N T A T I O N  A S S E S S M E N T
the Development of National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, which are intended to be used as a guidance tool for states in the implementation of Rio 
Principle 10.255
3.6 Human Rights Safeguards in International Climate Finance Mechanisms
(a) Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM modalities and procedures include rules that require stakeholder consultation (LSC) and global stakeholder 
consultation (GSC) prior to the validation of a CDM project.256 These include rules directing the project participants 
and coordinating/managing entities to inform the public about the proposed CDM project, invite comments from 
local and global stakeholders, and explain how these comments were considered in the decision-making process.257 
These rules are expressed in relatively general terms, lacking definite criteria for what constitutes adequate 
stakeholder consultation. Moreover, the rules do not require the consent of local stakeholders, nor do they 
outline any substantive requirements to promote the well-being of local people or the protection of rights (e.g., 
requirements for equitable distribution of project benefits). Nor is there any framework for prioritizing projects 
that will have beneficial impacts on the poor and other vulnerable groups, and their local environments.258 And 
although the project participants may include commitments to address stakeholder comments in the CDM 
project (e.g., commitments for job creation, mitigation of environmental harms, or compensation for land), there 
are no rules for monitoring the status or completion of those commitments. Finally, there are no provisions for 
stakeholders wishing to raise concerns about a project after it has been validated and registered, nor is there a 
grievance mechanism for individuals and communities who have been harmed by CDM projects. 
As a result of these procedural deficiencies, Carbon Market Watch concluded that many CDM projects have been 
registered “despite insufficient local stakeholder consultation, strong local opposition and clear evidence that 
projects cause harm to the local populations and/or ecosystems.”259 
The Executive Board of the CDM has taken steps to improve stakeholder consultation for CDM projects. For 
example, at its seventieth meeting in 2012, the Board issued a decision directing Designated Operational Entities 
(DOEs) to assess whether LSC is still adequate when significant changes occur in the project design after the initial 
LSC.260 However, as noted in a recent concept note on improving stakeholder consultation in CDM projects, there 
are additional changes that could be made to the CDM rule and regulations “to increase the participation of 
stakeholders in, and the transparency, clarity, and effectiveness of,” the local and global stakeholder consultation 
processes.261 Recommendations for the CDM and other climate finance mechanisms are presented in Part 4. 
The lack of adequate provisions for stakeholder consultation in this context reflects a failure on the part of 
governments to protect and promote both substantive and procedural human rights. As noted in section 1.2, 
there are some egregious examples of CDM projects that have resulted in the violation of human rights through 
displacement and the destruction of livelihoods. Better safeguards are needed to ensure that such violations do 
not occur in the context of future CDM projects.
(b) REDD+
The Cancun Agreements included a set of safeguards that serve as guidance for forest activities aimed at mitigating 
climate change.262 These included some provisions that are relevant to the protection of human rights—e.g., that 
projects should demonstrate “respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local 
communities” and that they should include the “full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular 
255 UNEP, Guidelines for the Development of National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation, and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, Decision SS.xI15, Part A, Feb. 26, 2010.
256 UNFCCC Decision 3/CMP.1, Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. FCCC/
KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (March 30, 2006); UNFCCC, CDM Standards, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Standards/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
257 Id.
258 PhIlIPPe Cullet, the kyoto ProtoCol and VulnerabIlIty: human rIghts and equIty dImensIon (International Environmental Law Research Centre 2010).
259 Carbon Market Watch, Social and Environmental Accountability of Climate Finance Instruments, 3 (Sept. 2015).
260 EB 70 report, para 91. The Board also adopted a decision to improve the global stakeholder consultation through further action. See EB 70 Report, para 
90(a)(b)(d), and (e).
261 Concept Note: Improving Stakeholder Consultation Processes, version 01.0, CDM-EB86-AA-A15, at Para. 6 (2015?).
262 Cancun Agreements, 92011), supra note 86, at Appendix I.
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indigenous peoples and local communities.”263 But these guidelines are expressed in very general, non-binding 
terms, and they do not explicitly require consent from those who live in the forests or utilize the forest resources 
that will be affected by REDD+ projects. They also do not contain language about the equitable distribution of 
benefits from forestry projects, which may not be a human right in of itself, but which has implications for the 
effective enjoyment of human rights for those who live in forests and depend on forest resources.264
A variety of proposed standards and guidance documents have been introduced in this context. Two notable 
examples include the REDD+ Social & Environmental Standards,265 and the Joint Guidelines from UN-REDD 
Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.266 These standards provide a more comprehensive framework 
for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and other local stakeholders, and ensuring an equitable distribution 
of benefits from REDD+ projects, but they are not binding on member states or other project stakeholders.267 That 
said, projects that are funded through the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) are required to 
comply with World Bank safeguard policies.268 These include ten social and environmental safeguards addressing 
the following issues: (i) environmental assessment, (ii) natural habitats, (iii) pest management, (iv) physical and 
cultural resources, (v) involuntary settlement, (vi), indigenous peoples, (vii) forests; (viii) dam safety; (ix) projects on 
international waterways; and (x) projects in disputed areas.269 However, compliance with the World Bank safeguards 
may not ensure that rights will be respected, because the existing safeguards arguably do not fully reflect existing 
human rights obligations, such as the obligation to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for projects that 
adversely affect indigenous peoples.270 The World Bank is currently working on revisions to the safeguard policies, 
which may result in positive human rights outcomes—for example, the current draft requires FPIC for projects that 
affect indigenous lands and resources or result in the displacement of indigenous communities.271 However, some 
stakeholders are concerned that the revisions will ultimately weaken protections for affected communities and the 
environment, as a result of roll backs in due diligence and other procedural requirements.272
Ultimately, to fulfill obligations to protect and promote human rights, countries should ensure that any REDD+ 
projects financed within their jurisdiction include adequate public participation mechanisms and that they do not 
result in the dispossession of people from forest lands and resources. Special attention should be paid to the rights 
of indigenous people in this context, and in particular, the right to FPIC. The COP should also consider adopting a 
more concrete safeguard policy that applies to all REDD+ projects.
(c) Green Climate Fund
In 2014, the GCF Board decided to adopt, on an interim basis, the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) 
environmental and social performance standards for GCF-funded projects.273 The IFC safeguards include eight 
performance standards addressing the following issues: (i) Assessment and management of social and environmental 
risks and impacts; (ii) Labor and working conditions; (iii) Resource efficiency and pollution prevention; (iv) Community 
health; (v) Safety and security; (vi) Land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; (vii) Biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable management of living natural resources; (viii) Full respect of rights of indigenous people and protection 
of cultural heritage. The Board also adopted terms of reference for an “Independent Redress Mechanism” to 
receive complaints related to the operation of the Fund and make operation.274 Once operational, peoples and 
communities who are directly affected by adverse impacts of projects resulting from a failure to implement the IFC 
safeguards can submit a complaint to the mechanism. The mechanism can make recommendations on a specific 
project or on operational policies and procedures.
263 Id. at p. 2(c),(d).
264 See Thomas Sikor et al., REDD-plus, forest people’s rights, and nested climate governance, 20 global enVIronmental Change 423 (2010).
265 redd+ soCIal & enVIronmental standards, version 2, Sept. 10, 2012. 
266 forest Carbon PartnershIP and un-redd Programme, guIdelInes on stakeholder engagement In redd+ readIness (2012). 
267 For a more detailed assessment of REDD+ finance safeguards, see Stephanie Roe, et al., safeguards In bIlateral redd+ fInanCe (Climate Focus 2014).
268  Alternatively, for projects undertaken in accordance with the FCPF’s “Common Approach”, projects must achieve “substantial equivalence” with the 
World Bank safeguard policies. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see alyssa Johl & yVes lador, a human rIghts-based aPProaCh to ClImate Finance 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2012).
269 The World Bank’s standards are derived from the IFC’s standards, and thus there are significant overlaps. World Bank, World Bank Performance Standards, 
http://go.worldbank.org/BZ9RCBSRB0 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
270 Johl & lador (2012), supra note 273, at 10.
271 World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework, Second Draft for Consultation, Section B, p. 18 (July 1, 2015).
272 Human Rights Watch, World Bank: Dangerous Rollback in Environmental, Social Protections (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/04/world-
bank-dangerous-rollback-environmental-social-protections; Philip Alston, Reprot of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UN Doc. 
A/70/274 (Aug. 4, 2015).
273 See Decisions of the Board – Green Climate Fund, GCF/B.07/11, Annex III, June 19, 2014. 
274 Decisions of the Board – Green Climate Fund, Terms of Reference for the Independent Redress Mechanism, GCF/B.06/06, Feb. 13, 2014.
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The IFC standards appear to provide adequate protection for human rights—for example, they specify that, in 
the context of land acquisition projects, project proponents should “avoid/minimize displacement,” “avoid forced 
eviction,” and “improve or restore livelihoods and standards of living.”275 They also require FPIC for indigenous 
peoples under specified circumstances.276 These substantive provisions are complemented by the procedural 
mechanisms noted above.
Thus, the safeguards provided for the GCF appear to be sufficient for the protection and promotion of both 
procedural and substantive human rights, and should be adopted as permanent guidelines, ideally with additional 
provisions on internal monitoring and assessment.
(d) Adaptation Fund
The Adaptation Fund Board approved an Environmental and Social Policy in November 2013.277 The policy outlines 
a process for screening projects and programs based on their environmental and social impacts, and adopting 
measures to mitigate any adverse impacts. Specifically, the policy requires implementing entities to adopt measures 
to avoid or, where avoidance is impossible, minimize environmental and social risks, and monitor and report on 
the status of those measures during and at the end of implementation. It also outlines a set of social principles to 
guide the impact assessment process, which are more comprehensive than some of the other safeguard policies. 
Some notable aspects of these principles include:
• They explicitly require that all projects supported by the Fund “respect and where applicable promote 
human rights,”278 and furthermore, that all projects adhere to “core labour standards as identified 
275 IFC PS5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.
276 IFC PS7: Indigenous Peoples.
277 adaPtatIon fund board, enVIronmental and soCIal PolICy (2013).
278 Id. at p. 15.
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by the International Labour Organization”279 and the “rights and responsibilities set forth in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other applicable international instruments relating 
to indigenous peoples.” 280
• They require that projects be designed and implemented in a way that “avoids or minimizes the 
need for involuntary resettlement” and specify requirements for when “limited involuntary settlement 
is unavoidable” which include “socially feasible resettlement alternatives or fair and adequate 
compensation.”
• They require that all supported projects “provide fair and equitable access to benefits in a manner 
that is inclusive and does not impede access to basic health services, clean water and sanitation, 
energy, education, housing, safe and decent working conditions, and land rights,” and that projects 
“should not exacerbate existing inequities, particularly with respect to marginalized or vulnerable 
groups.”281 They also include specific provisions to ensure that project proponents respect the rights 
of marginalized and vulnerable groups and women.282
• They include provisions for habitat protection, conservation of biological diversity, pollution prevention, 
resource efficiency, public health, physical and cultural heritage, and land and soil conservation.283
The policy also includes relatively robust requirements for public disclosure and consultation, and for monitoring, 
reporting, and evaluating the implementation of projects and risk mitigation measures.284 Finally the policy requires 
that the implementing entities identify a grievance mechanism that will provide affected persons with an “accessible, 
transparent, fair and effective process for receiving and addressing their complaints about environmental or social 
harms” caused by the project, and also allows for complaints to be submitted to the Adaptation Fund Board 
secretariat.285
Thus, like the Green Climate Fund, these safeguards appear to be sufficient for the protection and promotion of 
both substantive and procedural human rights.
(e) Global Environment Facility
The GEF is the oldest UNFCCC financial mechanism, and it manages two additional funds established by the COP: 
the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF). In 2011, the GEF Council 
has also approved its own set of Policies on Environmental and Social Safeguards and Gender Mainstreaming.286 
The environmental and social safeguards are similar to the World Bank safeguards.287 They require an initial 
screening for environmental and social impacts, and outline various substantive requirements for the protection 
of natural habitats, avoiding and minimizing involuntary resettlement, protecting the rights of indigenous peoples 
(but unlike the World bank, they require FPIC), pest management, the protection of physical cultural resources, and 
dam safety. Apart from the requirements for consulting with and respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, the 
public participation provisions are very weak. The social and environmental policy also lacks provisions to address 
adverse or disproportionate impacts on vulnerable or marginalized groups. 
The policy on gender mainstreaming outlines additional criteria for soliciting input from women and avoiding 
discriminatory outcomes. The policy calls for the preparation of a “gender mainstreaming strategy or plan” to 
“cover gender sensitive activities” but does not contain very robust requirements for ensuring that women are fully 
involved in the decision-making process and that benefits are equally distributed to women.288 
The GEF safeguards provide some protection for human rights, but additional provisions on public notice and 
consultation would help to ensure that procedural rights are fully respected in the context of GEF-funded projects.
279 Id. at p. 17.
280 Id. at p. 18.
281 Id. at p.13.
282 Id. at pp.14, 16.
283 Id. at pp. 20-26.
284 Id. at pp. 32, 33.
285 Id. at p. 34.
286 GEF Policies on Environmental and Social Safeguards and Gender Mainstreaming, GEF/C.40/10/REv.1, May 26, 2011.
287 Johl & lador (2012), supra note 273, at 8.
288 GEF Policies (2011), supra note 291, at Annex II, p. 18.
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Recommendations
Based on the following summary of human rights obligations and implementation, this report makes the following 
recommendations on how the UNFCCC Parties and other actors can better integrate human rights considerations 
into their mitigation and adaptation activities.
4.1 International Cooperation
More Ambitious Mitigation Targets – Even if all of the INDCs are fully implemented, the anticipated level of 
global warming will result in extreme climatic and environmental impacts and widespread adverse effects on 
human rights. The Parties should continue to increase their mitigation ambition so as to ensure that the global 
average temperature increase remains at or below 2.0°C, and preferably 1.5°C. To this end, the Paris agreement 
should include a schedule for assessing and revisiting country commitments with the aim of increasing, over 
time, the ambition of the climate targets set by countries. Another way to encourage more ambition would be to 
establish scientifically-based targets for all countries and then assess the performance of countries with respect 
to these targets. The targets could account for countries’ historical and current GHG emissions (on a country-
wide, per capita, and per unit of GDP basis) as well as the financial and technical capacity of the country to 
make emissions reductions. Nations should also undertake efforts to reduce emissions above and beyond their 
international commitments.
Recognize the Link Between Climate Change and Human Rights in the Paris Agreement: The COP should 
expressly refer to both the effects of climate change on the exercise of human rights and the need for Parties to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights in all climate-related activities. This could include: (i) recognizing 
the human rights-climate change nexus in the preamble to the agreement; (ii) noting that one purpose of the 
agreement is to protect, respect, and fulfill the human rights of all persons; (iii) calling for mitigation commitments 
that are sufficient to fully protect human rights; (iv) calling upon the parties to ensure that all mitigation and 
adaptation activities do not violate human rights; and (v) incorporating more robust human rights safeguards into 
climate finance mechanisms.
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Human Rights Safeguards for International Climate Finance Mechanisms – The safeguards for the various 
climate funds and other mechanisms used to finance mitigation and adaptation projects should be made uniform 
and revised to fully account for human rights considerations. The Adaptation Fund policy provides a good model, 
although it would be useful to flesh out many of the provisions in that policy with more detailed guidance. In 
particular, these safeguards should specify procedural requirements as well as substantive requirements—e.g., 
“no harm” rules to ensure that projects do not adversely affect local communities. One way to achieve this would 
be to establish a social and environmental safeguard policy that applies to all UNFCCC mechanisms and funds, 
accompanied by a more detailed implementation guide.
Financial Assistance to Developing Countries – It is imperative that developed countries increase financial 
assistance to developing countries, and in particular, the LDCs and countries that are most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. In particular, the amount of funding available for adaptation measures in these countries 
should be significantly increased in order to account for the disproportionate adverse effects of climate change on 
people, settlements, and ecosystems. The $100 billion goal should not be viewed as an overarching goal for all 
climate finance in developed countries, as it is inadequate even to cover the cost of mitigation measures (let alone 
adaptation measures). Rather, separate funding targets should be established for adaptation measures.
Climate Displacement and Migration – Climate change could contribute to the temporary displacement and 
permanent migration of millions of people in the coming decades. Countries should cooperate in the development 
of an international mechanism for addressing climate-induced displacement and migration, both within and 
across domestic borders. Proposals have already been made for the creation of “Climate Change Displacement 
Coordination Facility” within the UNFCCC, and countries should consider supporting the development of such a 
facility.289 
Loss and Damage – Countries should also continue to discuss the broader issue of loss and damage in a 
transparent way that will address the concerns of all affected countries. This could occur within the framework 
of the existing Warsaw Mechanism, or a new platform could be developed (most likely within the UNFCCC). 
Additional stakeholders—such as the UN human rights agencies and expert bodies—could be included in this 
dialogue. 
New Mechanisms for International Coordination and Accountability – To facilitate the activities noted 
above and other rights-related goals, it may be desirable to introduce new mechanisms for sharing information, 
coordinating responses, and promoting accountability. Some examples might include: 
• Work Programme on Human Rights – The COP could establish a work program on human rights, 
pursuant to the recommendation of the Special Procedures mandate-holders of the Human Rights 
Council.290 This work programme could compile data, conduct research, evaluate progress, and develop 
recommendations on how human rights can be better integrated into climate change responses.
• Information Sharing Platform – Alternatively, or as a complement to a UNFCCC work program, the 
COP and/or another UN body could introduce a platform for compiling and sharing information and 
best practices—e.g., examples of successful mitigation and adaptation measures with human rights 
co-benefits, national and sub-national policies that are particularly mindful of human rights, and cost-
effective strategies for improving public participation in climate-related decision-making.
• Human Rights Accountability – The COP or another UN body could establish an independent 
accountability mechanism to evaluate human rights performance in the context of climate-related 
actions taken by countries and private actors. The UNHCR could also issue a declaration or guidance 
document calling upon countries to incorporate climate-related considerations into their UPR reports.
289 For a discussion of possible functions that this facility could serve, see Jessica Wentz and Michael Burger, Designing a Climate Change Displacement 
Coordination Facility: Key Issues for COP 21 (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 2015).
290 An Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to the State Parties to the UNFCCC (Oct. 17, 2014), supra note 
160.
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Continued Focus on Environmental Protection and Conservation – A continued focus on environmental 
protection and conservation will be necessary to address the potential effects of climate change on ecosystems, 
biodiversity, and natural resources. As such, governmental and private actors should remain dedicated to these 
goals—for example, through the ongoing and enhanced implementation of MEAs, such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. 
4.2 National Measures
National Mitigation – Regardless of what happens within the UNFCCC, countries should continue to pursue 
domestic GHG reductions to the greatest extent practicable and with a target of achieving a net zero carbon 
economy, as this will be necessary to safeguard the human rights of persons both within and outside of their 
territory.
National Adaptation Planning – Countries should consider how to align human rights and climate change 
adaptation objectives. One approach would be to pursue an integrated response to climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction, in order to better safeguard human rights in the face of climate-related disasters. 
National planners should also pursue adaptation measures with environmental and social co-benefits, such as 
ecosystem-based adaptation, which refers to the conservation, sustainable management and restoration of 
natural ecosystems to help people adapt to climate change. Decision-makers can refer to UNEP’s Ecosystem-Based 
Adaptation Guidance for additional information on this approach.291 Finally, countries must ensure that they do not 
discriminate against marginalized groups in all adaptation planning activities and in responses to climate-related 
hazards and disasters.
National Adoption of Human Rights Protections – Countries should incorporate human rights norms into their 
domestic legal frameworks, including (but not limited to) laws that specifically address climate change. This could 
include, for example, specific provisions to ensure that the affected public has knowledge of and an adequate 
opportunity to comment on proposals for domestic mitigation and adaptation policies. In developing domestic 
policies, countries can consult with existing MEAs, the Bali Guidelines Bali Guidelines for the Development of 
National Legislation on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
and a Compilation of Good Practices published earlier this year by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and 
Environment,292 among other resources.
4.3 Local Governments and Private Actors
Local Governments – Local governments should undertake measures to reduce GHG emissions within their 
jurisdiction and pursue adaptation objectives in a manner that is mindful of human rights. As with national 
governments, local governments should ensure that adaptation responses are non-discriminatory, consider 
integrating climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction programs, and pursue adaptation measures with 
environmental and social co-benefits, such as ecosystem-based adaptation.
Private Sector - Private actors also have important roles to play in addressing climate change and protecting 
human rights. They can place pressure on national governments to adopt more ambitious policies and cooperate 
in international negotiations, and can also undertake their own initiatives to reduce their carbon foot print and 
ensure that they respect human rights in all of their activities. In particular, large businesses should adopt policies 
that correspond with the recommendations set forth in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
291 UNEP, Ecosystem-Based Adaptation Decision Support Framework, http://www.unep.org/climatechange/adaptation/EbA/EBADecisionSupportFramework/
tabid/102163/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
292 Knox, Compilation of Good Practices (2015), supra note 253.
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Conclusion
Climate change and responses to climate change will have a profound effect on the exercise of human rights for 
millions and perhaps billions of people across the world. This will occur through both direct impacts on humans 
and settlements, as well as through the degradation of the ecosystems and environmental resources upon which 
many lives and livelihoods depend. States have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights, and this 
includes obligations to mitigate domestic GHG emissions, protect citizens against the harmful effects of climate 
change, and ensure that responses to climate change do not result in human rights violations. Although states 
have taken important steps towards fulfilling these obligations, there is more to be done. In particular, states need 
to increase their ambition with respect to both climate change mitigation and adaptation, and work cooperatively 
to ensure the protection of human rights for all citizens across the world.
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